Russian Ambassador to North Korea: North Korean denuclearization will cost a lot of money. That is, not through the ministries of foreign affairs
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RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE DPRK
On October 12, 1948, the USSR was the first to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK. North Korea officially recognized the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the former USSR. On February 9, 2000, a new interstate Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation was signed in Pyongyang. The Pyongyang (2000) and Moscow Declarations (2001), signed during the visits of the President, also form the legal basis of Russian-North Korean relations. Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the DPRK and Chairman of the State Defense Committee of the DPRK Kim Jong Il to Russia.
Russia and the DPRK maintain a political dialogue at the highest and high levels, contacts and exchanges between various departments of the two countries, and inter-parliamentary ties are developing.
On August 24, 2011, Dmitry Medvedev held talks with Kim Jong Il in Ulan-Ude, during which they discussed a wide range of issues of bilateral relations, as well as regional issues, including the situation around the settlement of the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula. The agenda also included the implementation of trilateral (Russian Federation - Republic of Korea - DPRK) economic cooperation projects - connecting Korean railways with the Trans-Siberian Railway, building a power line and laying a gas pipeline from the Russian Federation to the Republic of Korea through the territory of the DPRK.
The death of Kim Jong Il (December 19, 2011) and the accelerated transfer of power to Kim Jong Un did not initially have a significant impact on the overall vector of development of bilateral relations. During the exchange of telegrams, Kim Jong-un assured the Russian leadership that the continuity of the DPRK's policy in the Russian direction would be preserved.
However, the North Korean nuclear missile experiments, carried out contrary to the demands of the world community in late 2012 - early 2013, could not but have a negative impact on the dynamics of the development of our relations. Russia supported the relevant UN Security Council Resolution 2094 of March 7, 2013, which further tightened sanctions aimed at stopping Pyongyang's programs in this area. Many planned bilateral events and contacts were cancelled. In particular, the meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission was postponed to a later date.
At the same time, efforts were continued to find ways to reduce tension on the peninsula and to resume the six-party talks on the settlement of the YPCP as soon as possible. In 2013, congratulatory telegrams were exchanged for highest level On the occasion of the Liberation Day of Korea (August 15), Vladimir Putin sent a telegram to Kim Jong-un on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK (September 9), our ministers congratulated each other on the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations (October 12). On July 4, 2013, consultations were held in Moscow between the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia V.G.Titov and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia I.V.Morgulov with the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK Kim Ge Gwan.
February 5-10 this year Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, visited the Russian Federation to take part in the opening ceremony of the XXII Winter Olympic Games. On February 7, in Sochi, he had a brief protocol contact with Vladimir Putin. Negotiations were also held with V.I. Matvienko.
During the visit to Pyongyang of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan R.N. Minnikhanov on March 21-22 this year. issues of bilateral trade and economic cooperation were substantively discussed.
On March 25-27, the Minister for Development visited Pyongyang Far East A.S. Galushki as co-chairman of the Russian-North Korean Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, during which a constructive exchange of views took place on further improvement and mechanisms of interstate cooperation in trade, economic and scientific industries.
On April 28-30, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation - Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Far Eastern Federal District Yu.P. Trutnev visited the DPRK. The head of the Russian delegation met with Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK Pak Pong Du, Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the DPRK Ro Du Cher.
The legal framework of bilateral relations continues to be improved - an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Preventing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of Living Marine Resources, an Agreement on the Regime of the State Border, an Agreement on the Settlement of the DPRK's Debt to the Russian Federation on Credits Provided by the USSR, and an Exchange Plan between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK for 2013-2014. and a number of other protocols and treaties. The Agreement on the Acceptance and Transfer of Persons Who Violate the Legislation of the Parties on the Entry, Exit and Stay of Foreign Citizens, and the Agreement on Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters are being prepared for signing.
Russia is one of the traditional trade and economic partners of the DPRK. International sanctions, as well as unilateral restrictions imposed by some countries, seriously complicate the development of our economic ties. Nevertheless, the volume of Russian-North Korean trade in 2013 increased by 64.2% compared to 2012 and amounted to 112.7 million US dollars, incl. Russian exports to the DPRK - 103.4 million dollars (an increase of 77.0%), imports from the DPRK - 9.3 million dollars (a decrease of 9.1%).
The only bilateral investment project being implemented in practice at this stage is the reconstruction of the Khasan-Rajin railway section (practically completed) and the third berth of the Rajin port (scheduled to be completed by mid-2014), carried out by Russian Railways in the interests of creating a large transshipment terminal.
Russia continues to provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK - in 2013-2014, through international organizations, fortified wheat flour, 50 fire engines, as well as sets of medical equipment and medicines were delivered to the DPRK. In addition, significant assistance is also coming through the bilateral line.
Contacts have somewhat intensified between public organizations, friendship societies, higher educational institutions. The tour of Russian creative teams in the DPRK resumed - on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in October 2013, the Orchestra of the 21st Century performed in Pyongyang under the direction of People's Artist of Russia P.B. Ovsyannikov. In April of this year. in the DPRK, the Ensemble of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia under the leadership of People's Artist of Russia V.P. Eliseev took part in the April Spring festival.
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DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
1. GENERAL
Area - 122.8 thousand square meters. km, or 55% of the entire territory of Korea. In the north it borders on China (1360 km) and the Russian Federation (39.1 km, including 16.9 km along the Tumangan River, 22.2 km by sea). The population is about 24.5 million people. The capital is Pyongyang (with suburbs - 2.6 million inhabitants).
Administratively, the DPRK consists of nine provinces, two cities with a special status - Nampo and Rason, counties and villages. The Rason trade and economic, Kaesong industrial and Kymgan tourist zones have a special administrative status.
2. GOVERNMENT
North Korea is a socialist state.
The State Defense Committee of the DPRK has been declared the supreme governing body of the country. Its First Chairman - Kim Jong-un - is the "top official", the supreme commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA).
According to the Constitution, the supreme legislative body is the unicameral Supreme People's Assembly (SPC) of the DPRK, elected for five years. Between sessions, its work is managed by the Presidium of the WPC. The last SNA elections were held in March 2014. Chairman of the Presidium of the WPC - Kim Yong Nam (represents the DPRK in foreign relations), Chairman of the WPC - Choi Tae Bok.
The highest administrative and executive body of power is the Cabinet of Ministers. Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers - Pak Pong Du.
Local authorities - provincial, city, county people's assemblies are elected for a period of four years. Between sessions, local power is exercised by people's committees.
A special role in North Korean society is played by the Workers' Party of Korea (First Secretary of the WPK - Kim Jong-un), which has about 4 million members and candidate members.
3. ECONOMIC SITUATION
The DPRK is pursuing a policy of "reliance on own forces» in the economy, focusing on a rigid administrative-command system. Position in national economy in a country experiencing a deep systemic socio-economic crisis remains difficult.
In 2013, at the March plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of China, a decision was made to pursue a new strategic course "penjin", the essence of which is to parallel economic construction and build-up of "nuclear deterrence forces".
North Korea is highly militarized. The number of the KPA is about 850 thousand people. About 15% of the budget is spent on defense.
4. FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITIES
The DPRK maintains diplomatic relations with 166 countries, as well as with the European Union and ASEAN, and is a member of more than 250 international organizations.
North Korea joined the UN at the same time as the Republic of Korea in 1991.
Pyongyang's foreign policy doctrine is based on the ideas of "independence" and "originality" opposed to globalization and openness in world politics and the economy. In international relations, the DPRK upholds the principle of state sovereignty and opposes any actions aimed at exerting forceful pressure and interfering in the internal affairs of independent states.
The DPRK carries out its foreign policy activities under the sanctions imposed in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions (Nos. 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094, 2270), condemning the North Korean nuclear missile program.
5. INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
The DPRK and the Republic of Korea were proclaimed respectively on September 9 and August 15, 1948 after the failure of attempts to recreate a unified Korean state. According to the Armistice Agreement, signed on July 27, 1953 following the war of 1950-1953, North and South Korea are separated by a military demarcation line, on both sides of which there is a demilitarized zone with a total width of 4 kilometers.
In July 1972, the Joint Statement of the North and the South was signed, which fixed the basic principles of unification - independently, without reliance on external forces; in peaceful way; on the basis of "great national consolidation".
In 1991, the DPRK and the ROK signed an agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, cooperation and exchanges, in 1992 they adopted a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
In the entire history of relations, two inter-Korean summits have taken place. Both took place in Pyongyang: June 13-15, 2000 between former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and then ROK President Kim Dae-jun and October 2-4, 2007 between Kim Jong Il and then ROK President Roh Moo-hyun.
The 2016 nuclear test in the DPRK and the launch of a launch vehicle complicated the prospects for normalizing inter-Korean relations and became a pretext for increasing US and ROK military activity in Northeast Asia.
6. RUSSIAN-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS
North Korea officially recognized the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the former USSR. On February 9, 2000, a new interstate Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation was signed in Pyongyang. The legal basis of Russian-North Korean relations is also made up of the Pyongyang (2000) and Moscow (2011) declarations, signed during the visits of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the DPRK and the Chairman of the State Defense Committee of the DPRK Kim Jong Il to Russia.
Russia and the DPRK maintain a political dialogue at the highest and high levels; develop contacts and exchanges between various departments of the two countries, inter-parliamentary relations.
North Korean nuclear missile experiments, carried out contrary to the requirements of the world community, Negative influence on the development of bilateral relations. Russia supported UN Security Council Resolution No. 2270 of March 2, 2016, which further tightened sanctions aimed at stopping Pyongyang's nuclear missile programs.
At the same time, efforts were continued to find ways to reduce tension on the peninsula and to resume the six-party talks on the settlement of the YPCP as soon as possible.
The legal framework of bilateral relations continues to be improved: an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Preventing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of Marine Resources, an Agreement on the Regime of the State Border, an Agreement on the Settlement of the DPRK’s Debt to the Russian Federation on Credits Provided by the USSR, and an Agreement on Acceptance and Transfer persons who violated the legislation on the entry, exit and stay of foreign citizens, the Agreement on Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters and a number of other documents.
The volume of Russian-North Korean trade remains low and in 2014 amounted to 92.3 million US dollars.
The only bilateral investment project that has received practical implementation is the reconstruction of the Khasan-Rajin railway section and the pier in the port of Rajin.
Russia continues to provide humanitarian assistance to the DPRK through international organizations, as well as through bilateral channels.
Contacts are being developed through public organizations, friendship societies, higher educational institutions.
Alexander Matsegora spoke about the conditions under which it is possible for Pyongyang to freeze nuclear explosions and missile launches
Alexander Matsegora
Moscow. January 30. site - The Russian Ambassador to the DPRK, in an interview with Interfax on the eve of the Diplomatic Worker's Day, spoke about the conditions under which it is possible for Pyongyang to freeze nuclear explosions and missile launches, about how the sanctions affected cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, and that contact with he has a North Korean leader, albeit indirectly, but he does.
Alexander Ivanovich, this year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the DPRK. Tell us how the countries are going to celebrate this significant date, are contacts between Moscow and Pyongyang planned at the highest and high level?
The 70th anniversary of our relations is indeed a very important and significant date, and of course we will celebrate it. It is expected that we will coordinate with our Korean colleagues some kind of informal plan: maybe it will not be signed, but there will be a plan. It will include a number of events that we will hold in Moscow, and the Koreans in Pyongyang. Moreover, these events will be held both at the level of ministries of foreign affairs, as I suppose, and at the level of embassies. Speaking of what our embassy will do in Pyongyang, I would like to suggest to our Korean colleagues that they give me the opportunity to speak on television. I already spoke on Korean TV in 2015, when we celebrated the 70th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, and I hope that they will give me such an opportunity again. This will probably be the main event for the embassy.
As for the events at the state or intergovernmental level, this issue is still in the process of discussion and agreement. I do not rule out that there will be some high-level visit. A decision in this regard has not yet been made. Apparently, there will be joint photo exhibitions dedicated to the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Our Korean colleagues are set for quite active events.
- A visit, you mean, from our side to the DPRK or vice versa?
Perhaps this will be an exchange of visits, because, as far as I know, contacts were planned between parliaments at a fairly high level. I do not rule out that this is exactly what will be discussed.
- That is, not through the ministries of foreign affairs?
This has not yet been discussed. Maybe in the near future there will be consultations on this matter, and some kind of agreement will be reached. So far there is no solution.
While in Pyongyang, at what level do you maintain contacts with the North Korean leadership? Have you ever been hosted by the leader of a country?
I personally know Kim Jong Un. True, we met him back in 2010. (Kim Jong-un has been the supreme leader of the DPRK since 2011 - IF). Since my arrival in Pyongyang (Matsegora has been the Russian Ambassador to the DPRK since December 2014 - IF) as an ambassador, we did not have such face-to-face meetings, but there were indirect contacts - for the transmission of oral or written messages, etc. And from the leadership of the DPRK, I communicate with Lee Soo-yong - he is a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, where he is responsible for foreign policy, and with Lee Yong Ho - Minister of Foreign Affairs. These are my most senior partners.
A question on the current situation: US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson rejected the Russian concept of a "double freeze", how big is the risk that, after the "Olympic truce", the situation on the Korean Peninsula will again escalate and return to the brink of military confrontation?
Although our American colleagues verbally reject our "double freeze" concept, in fact, the "double freeze" is now taking place. The Americans have postponed the dates of their exercises, while the Korean colleagues, for their part, refrain from launches and explosions. Basically, it's a "double freeze" in action - whether you like it or not. And, thank God, that this is happening.
As for the risk that the situation may escalate after the "Olympic truce", it must be said that the situation on the Korean Peninsula, unfortunately, is generally not amenable to long-term forecasting - this is influenced by many factors. In particular, what kind of exercises after the Olympics will the Americans conduct, how large-scale and provocative, according to the northerners, they will be. And a lot depends on how the inter-Korean events will be held now. I think that if they are successful and the Koreans get a taste for reconnecting, that will be a very serious factor in keeping the situation from escalating into tension. I really hope that this will happen.
The American side expressed concern about the safety of the DPRK's nuclear facilities in the event of internal political upheavals in that country. In your opinion, is there really a threat of internal political instability in the DPRK, and is there any reason to fear for the safety of nuclear facilities, including military ones?
As far as we know and are following the situation, there is absolutely no danger of domestic political destabilization in the country. The political situation in the DPRK is stable, the state and the leadership of the country are guaranteed to keep all processes under control, there are no protests. I don't know what the Americans' concern is based on. There are no threats or dangers of such a development of events now.
- That is, you also do not see a threat to the safety of nuclear facilities?
If there is no danger of domestic political instability, then no, of course, what can we talk about?
The leadership of the DPRK stated that, in fact, work on their nuclear missile program was completed. Does North Korea's nuclear missile potential pose a threat to Russia? Are there any signs that Pyongyang will stop developing its nuclear missile potential at this stage, or will it continue to develop the program, missile launches and nuclear tests?
The leadership of the DPRK, to be precise, stated that the goal of turning the country into a nuclear-missile power had been achieved. That is, there was no announcement of the completion of work on the program as such. This is a very important detail.
As for the threat to Russia, the Koreans have repeatedly stated that their missiles are not aimed at us, I think that this is actually the case. But the very fact of the presence of nuclear missile weapons in the DPRK, the persistence of a situation of permanent acute tension, the US-North Korean and inter-Korean confrontation, of course, leads to the fact that Russia does not feel safe either.
The North Korean nuclear test sites are located near our borders, and the wind rose there is such that if, God forbid, there is some kind of emergency situation, our territory may suffer. So, of course, we are not indifferent to what happens there. We are concerned about the situation on the Korean Peninsula - this is a fact.
As for whether Pyongyang will stop at this stage or continue developing its program, naturally, it is difficult for us to judge what thoughts and what plans the DPRK leadership has in this regard. I think that a lot will depend on how things go in inter-Korean relations. Because Pyongyang understands that another nuclear test or missile launch is not something that will call into question further inter-Korean rapprochement, but simply completely destroy it. From my point of view, if this rapprochement is successful, and Pyongyang feels that there are prospects for deeper interaction, despite the sanctions (which, perhaps, the Koreans will try to negotiate among themselves), then there is a serious possibility that the DPRK will refrain from new explosions and launches.
That is, you think that the US-South Korean exercises, which, although they were postponed, but in any case will take place, may not become a factor that will provoke North Korea to new tests?
Of course, northerners are very nervous when these exercises take place. Especially when the organizers of these exercises announce that they are working out the tasks of capturing Pyongyang, destroying the leadership of the DPRK, landing troops on the coast of the DPRK, and establishing administrative control over the provinces of North Korea. Well, who will like it? Of course, the North Koreans don't like it very much.
But I must say that in the past, the exercises were held every year. And even during these maneuvers, both the six-party and inter-Korean talks were taking place. The exercises, naturally, were a deterrent in the movement of northerners and southerners towards each other, and in general complicated the situation, but they were not an insurmountable obstacle.
On the question of inter-Korean contacts: does Russia support South Korea's initiative to switch to discussing denuclearization issues? Is Moscow ready to promote such a dialogue and offer one of the Russian cities as a platform for possible contacts?
What topics the Koreans will discuss at their meetings is, of course, primarily a question that they decide among themselves. At the moment, the northerners categorically refused to include the nuclear missile topic on the agenda. But, as it seems to me, they can reason soberly and understand that the southerners cannot avoid discussing it.
Another thing is that it is impossible to solve this problem only in the inter-Korean format. The North Koreans have said many times that their nuclear weapons are a response to the threat from the United States, which means that they will discuss this issue first of all with Washington.
As for whether we are ready to assist, I will say this: in past years we offered our help, offered our cities to southerners and northerners to organize their meetings. Although the problem is not in the meeting place, they can easily agree on this. They can meet in Panmunjom, and in Seoul, and in Pyongyang. But, if they suddenly want to go to Vladivostok, for example, I think that we will give them such an opportunity with great pleasure.
- That is, this issue is simply not on the agenda at the moment?
Not yet. So far, they are quite successfully negotiating in Panmunjom, in the demilitarized zone.
Recently, accusations against Russia have often been heard from the American side and in the Western press that we are somehow assisting Pyongyang in circumventing sanctions regarding oil supplies and the coal embargo. The latest accusations were made directly against us that we are violating the provisions of the UN Security Council resolution. Are these claims justified?
These claims are completely unfounded. As an ambassador, I know this situation very well. We have open statistics on the supply of petroleum products to North Korea, and every month we transmit data on the volume of these supplies to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee. The volumes are small: about 500-600-700 tons of high-quality gasoline per month.
As for reloading at sea, that is, illegal delivery, this is simply unprofitable from an economic point of view, not to mention the fact that we are committed to the resolution and are fully implementing it. After the introduction of additional internal excises on Russian oil products, they became too expensive for Koreans. For such deliveries, our exporters have no economic incentive, not to mention the fact that they are not inclined to take risks and put their business at risk.
As for coal, Russia is the largest exporter of this type of raw material. Koreans used to be our competitors in the Chinese market. V last years North Korea supplied China with up to 25 million tons of coal. It is simply impossible to imagine that we will start with our own coal with an incredible risk of suddenly selling North Korean coal.
I don't know what is the purpose of those who are trying to spread these rumors. Perhaps they simply seek to finally intimidate companies that would be ready to cooperate with North Korea in legal areas.
And there are enough such areas left, for example, oil products. About 60,000 tons can be legally shipped to the DPRK within the quotas determined by the Security Council. But in order to intimidate suppliers, to drive them away from North Korea, such accusations may be made against us.
Much is said about China even "overfulfilling" the requirements of the resolution, while we are the opposite. That is, we do not have such a task - to minimize cooperation with North Korea, following the calls from Washington?
Of course not. We have no such task. We consider all these unilateral sanctions illegitimate. Sanctions that the Americans and other states impose unilaterally, bypassing the Security Council, we consider illegal and aimed solely at creating additional problems for the people of North Korea.
And the resolutions indicate that they are focused primarily on preventing the development of North Korea's nuclear missile programs, and not against the civilian economy and population. Therefore, where it is permitted by the resolutions, we will cooperate. For example, to supply food if the Koreans are willing to pay for it, legally supply oil products within certain quotas, and so on.
Another aspect of the sanctions is the situation with North Korean workers. Will Russia comply with the requirement of the UN Security Council resolution to stop the use of North Korean labor within 24 months, and will this not create problems in bilateral relations with the DPRK? Are measures being prepared in this regard to prevent the influx of illegal workers from the DPRK, in particular, when passenger traffic is resumed along the Vladivostok-Rajin ferry route?
North Korean illegal immigrants in Russia in massive quantities - this is absolutely out of the question. First, unlike all other guest workers, Koreans come to us through Korean state-owned companies. They send them to us not one by one, but in teams, construction teams. I simply cannot imagine that they will go to Russia illegally, it is impossible, from any point of view. Of course, we will be forced to comply with this decision of the Security Council, especially since we voted for it, and send all workers from Russia by the end of 2019. Although, to be honest, we will create serious problems for them in this way. Korean workers in Russia worked and earned money not only for their state, but also for their families. On average, every Korean working in Russia supports more than 10 of his relatives with the money he earns here. Now they are returning, and the question arises how to support them further while in North Korea. For these returning tens of thousands of people, it is necessary to look for work, there is a problem with employment. But there is nowhere to go. Once the decision is made, we will definitely implement it. This is a very serious blow to families, and frankly, if the initiators of this idea had the task of creating problems for ordinary people in the DPRK, they can be "congratulated", they created these problems.
But at the same time, the stated goal of the ban on the use of North Korean labor is to cut off one of the sources of funding for the nuclear missile program.
You know, the initiators of increased pressure on the DPRK, it seems, are simply forcing the North Koreans to once again demonstrate their nuclear missile capabilities and prove that they do not care about these new sanctions. It is impossible to settle the North Korean missile and nuclear problem solely through economic and military pressure.
The last question concerns our trade and economic cooperation: at what level is it now and in what direction is it moving?
Our trade is now at an extremely low level, and there is a completely objective reason for that. First, the system of legal payments has been completely destroyed. It is impossible to pay money for Korean goods through a bank, it is also impossible to sell our goods to Koreans, since they will not be able to transfer their money to our bank, I mean dollars and euros.
As for ships, in fact, due to unilateral US sanctions, now any ship that calls at a Korean port cannot call at any other port for 180 days. As a result, shipowners refuse to go to the DPRK. And so the situation in trade, not only with Russia, by the way, is now critical.
- Precisely because of the sanctions?
It's because of the sanctions. I repeat, if the initiators of these sanctions aimed to create economic problems for the DPRK, then they succeeded in this. Although neither explosions nor launches could be stopped. Our trade is now limited to one-time deliveries, and our suppliers, who are still working with Koreans, are paid in rubles. Ruble payments are possible, but such exchange of goods takes place in very small volumes. Last year, according to preliminary estimates, our trade amounted to just over $80 million. This year, I think this volume will decrease even more.
Alexander Matsegora spoke about the difficulties in Russian-North Korean cooperation under sanctions
Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora
Moscow. 18 July. website - The ambassador of the Russian Federation spoke in an interview with Interfax about how long the emerging denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will last, about the role of Russia in this process, about the difficulties in Russian-North Korean cooperation under sanctions, about the fate of joint economic projects involving Russia and the two Koreas in North Korea Alexander Matsegora.
Alexander Ivanovich, has it already begun practical training to the Russian-North Korean summit, is there any clarity about where and when it will be held, and is it possible that the summit will be held not in Russia, but in the DPRK?
With regard to the Russian-North Korean summit, I would like to refer you to the statement on this subject by the press secretary of the President D.S. Peskov. As a last resort, you can refer to the press release of the CTC on the results of the meeting between Sergei Viktorovich Lavrov and the leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong-un. It said the following: the parties agreed to hold a summit meeting. There is nothing to add to this yet.
US officials say full denuclearization in North Korea can be achieved in one year. How realistic are these forecasts, what are our calculations, and is it possible to say that this process has already been launched, or is it all at the level of a declaration and there is still a long way to go before any real progress?
The process of denuclearization of the DPRK cannot be separated from the solution of the second part of the problem - the provision of guarantees to Pyongyang that the United States will renounce hostility towards the republic. This is exactly what the North Koreans indicate in their official documents, including the results of Trump's meeting with Kim Jong-un.
That is, they are talking not only about guarantees of military security. Non-hostility guarantees are a much broader concept.
So, if the US president guarantees such a renunciation of hostility, and the North Korean leader believes in this, given that the Koreans, at the call of their leader, are ready for any labor exploits (remember how they almost instantly destroyed the Phungeri nuclear test site), Pyongyang can very quickly clean up your nuclear site. The main thing is to have such trust. However, there are other questions as well. For example, financial resources.
North Korean denuclearization will cost a lot of money. I will give one example. In 2008, the Six-Party Process agreed, as one of the first steps, to decommission the cooling tower of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. So, the preparation of the project for its dismantling and the explosion itself cost 2.5 million dollars, which the Americans paid out of their own pocket. Now the Koreans have carried out calculations at their own expense and destroyed the Phungeri test site, and I doubt very much that they will continue to do everything at their own expense. After all, we are talking about dozens of nuclear facilities. The United States will certainly want to destroy uranium mines, enterprises, infrastructure, scientific laboratories, etc. to the ground. All this costs a lot of money and, of course, will require expert verification and time.
The task is daunting, but the fact that the Americans are talking to the Koreans on this subject, that the US president and secretary of state are talking to the leadership of the DPRK on this subject is in itself a huge step forward. Washington is not threatening, is not pulling squadrons and squadrons to the Korean Peninsula, but is looking for a negotiated settlement - this can only be welcomed.
At the moment, is there any idea who could take on this financial burden and is this issue being discussed at all?
In general, judging by what the Koreans said following the visit of US Secretary of State Pompeo to Pyongyang, our American colleagues this time were not ready to discuss such details, including what they could give in return. The Koreans lament that they expected to receive proposals from the Americans on the creation of a system for maintaining peace and security of peace on the Korean Peninsula (this was indicated in a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry following Pompeo's visit). But that did not happen.
- And what do the North Koreans invest in the concept of "renunciation of hostility"?
They have never deciphered this concept in one paragraph. However, if you put together everything that was previously written by North Korean authors, who always express only the official position, on this topic, you get a rather extensive list of requirements. This is the signing of a peace treaty, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the opening of embassies, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, the revision of US-South Korean defense agreements, and so on. It is clear that the entire list is a maximum program. What is the minimum they will agree to, one should ask the Koreans, but Pyongyang's position on request is very serious.
South Korean and American media write that the DPRK has allegedly stepped up work at the nuclear test site at the nuclear center in Yongbyon, the rocket engine test site is operating, in general, they are expanding their ballistic missile enterprises, and that in reality, Western journalists suggest that Pyongyang deliberately understates its nuclear capabilities. Do we have any information on this subject that could confirm or refute these reports? And how sincere do you think Pyongyang is in its desire for denuclearization, or are both the American and North Korean sides behaving on the principle of "if you want peace, prepare for war"?
The list of North Korean nuclear facilities has already been presented once during the Six-Party Talks. (Russia, China, USA, Japan and two Koreas - IF), and on this list we at one time broke a lot of teeth and spears. Naturally, the Americans were unhappy, it seemed to them that the Koreans did not include all the objects in it.
By the way, this topic promises to be one of the most difficult in the future. Indeed, in practical terms, the conversation should begin with agreeing on a list of objects that are subject to destruction as part of the denuclearization process. It is difficult to avoid a situation in which the Americans will consider that this or that object belongs to the nuclear program, and the Koreans will say that this is a purely civilian enterprise. In response, the Americans will demand that they be allowed into the place in order to make sure what this object really is, and so on. We've been through all this before. However, be that as it may, all this work will have to be done. It is difficult for me to answer your question about American satellite data.
As for the sincerity of Kim Jong-un, judging by what and how he said during a meeting in Singapore with Trump and during a conversation with Lavrov in Pyongyang - and I was a direct participant in the latter, it seemed to me that he was very sincere. This, however, is my purely personal opinion.
Based on the publications in the media of data from American satellites against the background of the warming of relations between the US and the DPRK, can we conclude that the American side is not so open?
Americans, for example, in the context of Russian-American relations, often choose the time and nature of some informational stuffing in order to resolve some of their domestic political issues. I do not rule out that here we are dealing with a similar case. There are many in the US who would like to question what Trump is doing on the Korean platform.
Assuming that US-North Korean contacts move forward, will they need the cooperation of other parties anyway? Is Russia ready to provide assistance in the destruction of nuclear weapons to the DPRK, taking into account our experience in this area?
Our president said that, if necessary, we are ready to provide our guarantees. Of course, everything related to the elimination of the military nuclear potential of the DPRK is a task that should be dealt with primarily by the nuclear powers, the "nuclear five", including Russia.
We have been involved in this process in previous attempts to resolve the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula and we will definitely join this process in the future. However, I'm afraid that it will be some time before this issue becomes relevant.
Unlike the United States, the Russian side, like the North Korean side, speaks of the need to denuclearize the entire Korean Peninsula. Does this mean that nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from the territory of South Korea, that American troops should leave the peninsula? And should denuclearization be connected with the dismantling of the American missile defense system in South Korea and Japan?
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in the Singapore Declaration this topic is referred to as nuclear issue Korean Peninsula, not the North Korean nuclear issue. This is the unchanging position of our North Korean colleagues, and the Americans in Singapore accepted it. By the way, the six-party talks were also on the settlement of the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula.
The Americans at one time stated that they had completely withdrawn their nuclear weapons from South Korea, they claim that now they are not there. This topic was also raised during the Six-Party Talks. The North Koreans said that if their opponents wanted to check everything, then they would also demand checks of facilities in the South to confirm the absence of American nuclear weapons there. You can't refuse the logic of the northerners, although the Americans and the southerners, I remember, were very nervous. Including questions from the northern side about calls to the ports of the Republic of Korea by American nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers (the Americans do not confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on their ships that call at the ports of South Korea).
So the concept of the "nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula" has a serious meaning and meaning.
You mentioned the verifiable nature of denuclearization. From Washington we hear the formula that the lifting of sanctions is possible only after this process acquires a verifiable irreversible character. How do we feel about this formula, and what steps, in your opinion, should Pyongyang take to start the gradual lifting of sanctions?
I return to the Singapore Declaration. There were four points: in the first place - the normalization of bilateral relations between the DPRK and the United States, in the second - the creation of a peacekeeping system on the Korean Peninsula; on the third - denuclearization; on the fourth - the return of the remains of American prisoners of war who died during the Korean War. The day after Kim Jong-un returned to Pyongyang, local newspapers published a large reporting material on the results of his visit. The following was literally noted there: US President Trump agreed that the actions of the parties as part of the denuclearization process should be phased and synchronous. This means that the US administration has an understanding of the counterproductiveness of demands for exclusively unilateral steps on the part of the DPRK, something must be offered and done in return. Easing sanctions is one option.
- Did Pyongyang ask us for assistance in lifting international sanctions?
The fact is that the DPRK does not recognize the sanctions of the UN Security Council. They believe that these restrictions are unfair and illegal, and refuse to recognize them. Raise the question of their weakening or removal-recognize the sanctions. There is such logic here.
How can you assess the humanitarian situation in North Korea at the moment, does the country need any additional help. If so, which one first?
The subject of the humanitarian situation in the DPRK is primarily dealt with by the UN and other international and national humanitarian organizations.
The situation in this sense, of course, remains tense in the DPRK. We are talking about the shortage of food, and the shortage of medicines, and other difficulties experienced primarily by the least protected sections of the population. We do not record improvements in the situation. North Korea desperately needs help.
At the same time, sanctions, to put it mildly, do not contribute to solving the existing problems. The delivery, for example, of humanitarian supplies that international organizations collect, including, by the way, at the expense of Russia's contributions, faces incredible difficulties. It is difficult to finance the operational activities of workers of humanitarian agencies - banking channels are completely blocked.
Last week, Western news agencies reported, citing sources, that the American side had filed a complaint with the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee that North Korea was violating the oil embargo. This document featured a Russian ship under the Russian flag, which allegedly participated in the transshipment of oil products. Do you know anything about this?
In this matter, everything is clear to me. I'll explain why. The entire supply of gasoline and diesel fuel which is carried out from Russia, we report monthly to the 1718 Committee of the UN Security Council. As a rule, we are talking about several hundred tons of high-quality Russian gasoline and diesel fuel. This, as we understand it, fully satisfies the needs of the Republic in high-quality fuel. The main part of the oil products coming to the DPRK - and we are sometimes convinced of this at the work of the vehicle fleet of our Embassy - are of brands and varieties that are not produced in Russia. It is much cheaper than what comes from our country.
I don't see the point of using a Russian ship specifically to deliver products from third countries here in some not quite open way.
- But we haven't received any claims through official channels, have we?
We have not received such factual claims through official channels.
In an interview with our agency in January of this year, you said that you assessed the situation in our mutual trade at that time as critical. Tell me, has the situation changed for the better in these six months?
No. Unfortunately, if the situation has changed, then for the worse. Since the sanctions are in place, almost all channels are blocked, our businessmen do not want to take risks, our banks, one might say, shy away from any mention of the DPRK.
But I must say that in all these moments, which are not very joyful for me as an ambassador, there is one positive thing: I am once again convinced that our customs, our border guards, our financial control services are working accurately.
The relevant presidential decrees on Russia's relations with the DPRK are strictly implemented.
That is, it turns out that the statements that were made during the visit of the head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry to Moscow, during the visit of Sergei Viktorovich to Pyongyang that we intend to intensify, actively build up trade and economic cooperation so far only at the level of declarations, sanctions do not give to implement it?
We and our Korean colleagues have intentions and desires. There are great good developments. Objectively, our economies are complementary - the Koreans have what we need, the northerners have a desire to buy a lot of what we have. But, I repeat, there are serious, insurmountable problems that I have already mentioned. Judge for yourself, any ship that visits a North Korean port will not receive permission to enter most ports of other countries for a very long time. Unfortunately, conditions for trade with Pyongyang remain very difficult.
Both Seoul and Pyongyang expressed their readiness to restart trilateral economic projects with Russia. Which of these projects have a chance to be implemented in the foreseeable future?
I always say that trilateral cooperation projects have very good prospects. And sooner or later these programs will definitely be implemented - simply because of the obvious benefits for all participants.
But the sanctions also affect these areas of our interaction. For whatever you take, everything depends on sanctions, and not only the Security Council, but also national ones. The southerners, for example, still have the so-called "May 24 measures" in place, which generally prohibit companies and citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan from doing anything with North Korea. Therefore, everything that is said in Seoul about the intention to promote trilateral cooperation is, so far, declarations that have not been backed up by practical deeds. And if UN Security Council sanctions are a law binding on all of us, then South Korean measures are something that Seoul could correct on its own, especially given the process of inter-Korean reconciliation that has begun.
- It turns out that now the ball is on the side of Seoul?
In any case, this is the case with regard to the project for the supply of our coal to South Korea through the North Korean port of Rajin.
This project is not included in the UN Security Council sanctions, and we are ready even now to start supplying coal through Rajin to South Korea.
Are the North Koreans ready too?
They are ready, of course. As soon as our South Korean colleagues ease their sanctions on the Raja project, the port will come to life, work will begin, and the first step in a very promising area of trilateral cooperation will be taken.
The final question concerns North Korean workers, who by 2019, in accordance with the decisions of the UN Security Council, must leave the territory of the Russian Federation. How many contract workers from North Korea are currently in Russia?
Their number has been reduced by about half compared to what it was before the sanctions. (adopted in December 2017 - IF).
- That is, there were about 30 thousand people, and half remained?
Today, July 30, the editors of Voyennoye Obozreniye received a report from the DPRK embassy in the Russian Federation, which refers to the successful testing of the Hwaseong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile. "Military Review" gives the text of the letter in full:
Under the personal guidance of the Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, Chairman State Council On the night of July 28, Juche 106 (2017), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK State Council), Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the KPA, Supreme Leader of our Party, State and Army Comrade Kim Jong-un successfully conducted the second test launch of the Hwaseong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile .
The respected supreme leader, who always performs all-conquering miracles with his extraordinary military wisdom, courageous will and quick-witted resourcefulness and declares a checkmate of victory, refuting the predictions of the people of the world, presented the combat mission to the missile research sphere.
Carry out a test launch in the shortest possible time, staging the maximum range of the Hwaseong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile and once again confirm the reliability of the complete missile system.
Scientists and technicians in the field of national defense, loyal fighters of our party, who with absolute trust in the party share ideas, breath, steps and take any fortress in one fell swoop, fought a deadly battle with full confidence, which will clearly show the strong power of the strategic nuclear armed forces of the WPK around the world. And ahead of schedule completed the preparation of the second test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
During the preparation of the test launch of the second Hwaseong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile, the distinguished supreme leader received reports on this every day in a row. And he gave prudent instructions, and on the night of the launch day he personally went to the test launch site of the rocket and supervised on the spot.
This test launch was conducted to finalize the overall technical specifications of the weapon system, including the maximum fire range of the Hwaseong-14 ICBM capable of carrying a large heavy nuclear warhead.
As soon as the respected supreme leader ordered the launch, the Hwaseong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile immediately took off into deep space.
The Hwaseong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile launched in the northwestern region of our country rose to 3,724.9㎞ (maximum peak), flew 998㎞ in 47 minutes. 12 seconds and exactly hit the indicated water area on the high seas.
The test launch was carried out at the highest possible angle, staging the maximum reach of the fire, and did not have any negative impact on the security of the surrounding countries.
The distinguished senior leader proudly said that the reliability of the ICBM system was once again confirmed in this test launch, and the ability to launch an ICBM at any place and at any time was demonstrated. And it is clearly proven that the entire US mainland has now entered under our gunpoint.
The distinguished senior leader said that today we deliberately conducted a test launch of an ICBM, staged maximum range, in order to sternly warn the United States, which, having lost its mind the other day, is talking empty nonsense. Looking at the current level, the US policy makers probably correctly understood that if they even touch our state with their fingers, then the aggressive state of the so-called US will not be in vain.
The respected top leader said that arrogant war talk and the threat of U.S. extreme sanctions on our nation would, on the contrary, awaken, inspire us, and reinforce our case for having a nuclear weapon. And he stressed that for our people, who experienced the terrible scourge of war by American beasts on this earth, the mighty deterrence force of the war for the defense of the state is a necessary strategic choice, irreversible and incomparable with anything expensive strategic property.
The esteemed supreme leader pointed out that if, despite our repeated warning, the United States again sticks its bad face into our soil and launches an absurd game of nuclear weapons, we will correct their bad tendencies with our strategic nuclear forces, which we have shown in detail.
The Respected Supreme Leader warmly congratulated the scientists, technicians and workers in the field of missile research, who once again demonstrated to the world the independent dignity and majestic appearance of the Juche nuclear power, the world's leading country in missile development, by successfully conducting the second test launch of the Hwaseong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile ". And I took a picture with everyone. That touching sight will remain for a long time.
Our Republic, under the banner of the new line of parallel leadership of the great Workers' Party of Korea, will certainly achieve a final victory in the anti-imperialist and anti-American struggle by developing and improving more powerful strategic and Juche weapons, demonstrating to the whole world the invincible power and potential development forces of Juche Korea.
We remind you that the DPRK launched another intercontinental ballistic missile - the second in July. On the night of Saturday there were reports about the launch of a new ballistic missile in the DPRK towards the island of Hokkaido in the Sea of Japan. It was released in the mountainous province of Chagando. According to the South Korean military, the new DPRK missile flew about a thousand kilometers, reaching a maximum height of 3.7 thousand kilometers. In South Korea, it is believed that this time, presumably, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was tested. The United States also believes that North Korea has tested an intercontinental ballistic missile.
According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the rocket rose to a height of 681 kilometers and flew 732 kilometers, falling in the central part of the Sea of Japan. As noted in the Ministry of Defense, Moscow monitored the missile launch of Pyongyang, which was carried out in the direction from the borders of the Russian Federation and did not pose a danger to the territory of Russia.
