The signing of the Khasavyurt agreement. Khasavyurt guillotine for Russia. Request to the Constitutional Court of Russia

At the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries, they tend to believe that the decision on this ceasefire was wrong for the Russian side - the Khasavyurt agreements gave the Chechen separatists an opportunity to rest and accumulate forces and means for further hostilities.

An undying hotbed of conflict

In the first Chechen campaign, the federal troops were placed in obviously unfavorable conditions for themselves - the militants were supported by a significant part of the population of the rebellious republic, they were well oriented in the familiar mountainous terrain and were waging a largely successful partisan war. The liquidation of the first president of self-proclaimed Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, did not change the situation - the clashes continued, and the federal authorities realized that this bloody conflict could be protracted. The Kremlin made attempts to negotiate with the leadership of the militants, but these truces were short-lived each time. The situation was complicated by the fact that "illegal armed bandit formations" regularly received assistance from abroad - with weapons, money, and mercenaries. At the end of the summer of 1996, the separatists recaptured Grozny from the federal forces, and such strategically important settlements of Chechnya as Argun and Gudermes came under the control of the militants.

Chechnya was de facto recognized as independent

It was these strategic losses of the federal troops, according to some experts, that served as the reason for the conclusion of the Khasavyurt peace agreement, signed at the end of August of the same year. The agreement was signed by the then secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Alexander Lebed, and the chief of staff of the armed forces of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, the future unrecognized president of rebellious Chechnya. The agreement contained clauses on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of the republic, on the resumption of economic relations with Russia (in fact, financing of Chechnya from the center). The main thing in this agreement was what was written between the lines: Russia's de facto recognition of the independence of Chechnya. Although the consideration of this issue from a legal point of view was formally postponed until the full restoration of Chechnya after the war.

A useless contract

In essence, the legal aspects of this agreement were never observed by the Chechen side during the term of the agreement - it was drafted in such a way that the main obligations were imposed on Russia. The main one is the complete provision of the destroyed republic. In addition, a dangerous precedent was created, on the basis of which the other North Caucasian republics could also claim their rights to autonomy. Some State Duma deputies tried to check the agreement for compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, but the Constitutional Court of Russia did not consider this appeal. With the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, the situation in Chechnya only worsened: Islamic extremists were rapidly expanding their territory of influence, human trafficking flourished in the republic and cases of hostage-taking, facts of cruel oppression of the Russian-speaking population became more frequent. Nobody was going to restore the infrastructure of Chechnya, and because of the ethnic cleansing, everyone who did not belong to the Chechen nation was in a hurry to leave the republic. This "sluggish schizophrenia" continued until the 1999 attack by armed gangs in Dagestan. The second Chechen campaign began, this time this North Caucasian region remained in the counter-terrorist operation mode for 8 years, until 2009. The Russian authorities realized that they can only fight the militants by force, not agreeing to their terms.

On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (in the person of the chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (in the person of Aslan Maskhadov) in Khasavyurt (Dagestan) signed an armistice agreement (known as the Khasavyurt agreement that ended the first Chechen war). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
This is how the First Chechen War ended.

After the collapse of the USSR, against the background of aggravated nationalist sentiments in the republic, the former General of the Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev (pictured with a microphone), who headed the National Congress of the Chechen People (ACCN) created in 1990, announced the final withdrawal of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic, as a result of which Dzhokhar Dudayev became president of Chechnya. On November 2, 1991, by the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, these elections were declared illegal

On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On the introduction of state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic ", which caused a sharp aggravation of the situation in the republic: supporters of the separatists surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military towns, blocked railway and air hubs. Three days after the introduction of the state of emergency, the state of emergency was thwarted, and the decree had to be canceled on November 11 - after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. At the same time, the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992.

In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev (pictured in the center) ordered to transfer to the Dudayevites half of all weapons and ammunition available in Chechnya. According to the minister, this was a forced step, because a significant part of the "transferred" weapons had already been seized, and it was not possible to take out the rest due to the lack of soldiers and echelons. In turn, First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Lobov at a meeting of the State Duma explained the appearance a large number weapons from residents of the Chechen Republic as follows: “You know that in 1991 a huge amount of weapons were partially transferred, and partially - and mainly - seized by force during the withdrawal of troops from the Chechen Republic. It was a period of reorganization. The number of these weapons is estimated at tens of thousands of units, and they are dispersed throughout the Chechen Republic, buried in residential buildings, forests and caves "

Since the summer of 1994, hostilities have unfolded in Chechnya between the troops loyal to Dzhokhar Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council, unofficially supported by Russia. Troops under the command of Dudaev conducted offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan districts controlled by the opposition forces. These hostilities were accompanied by significant losses on both sides, tanks, artillery and mortars were used

Even before the announcement of the decision of the Russian authorities to send troops into Chechnya, on December 1, 1994, Russian aviation struck the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and thus disabled all the planes at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 "On Measures to Ensure Legality, Law and Order and Public Safety in the Territory of the Chechen Republic"

On December 11, 1994, units of the United Group of Forces (UGV), which consisted of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the north-west (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia) and from the east (from the territory of Dagestan)

The command of "measures to maintain constitutional order" in Chechnya was entrusted to the first deputy commander-in-chief of the ground forces Eduard Vorobyov, but he refused to lead the operation "due to its complete unpreparedness" and filed a letter of resignation from the Russian armed forces

The eastern grouping of the UGV was blocked in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan local residents... The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, it nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok grouping advanced the most successfully: on December 12, it approached the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny

A new offensive by the units of the united group of forces began on December 19, 1994. Vladikavkaz (western) grouping blocked Grozny with western direction bypassing the Sunzha ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) grouping occupied Dolinsky and blockaded Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and the paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the side of the Argun Gorge. Thus, in the first days of hostilities, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.

In mid-December 1994, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19, the first bombing strike was made on the city center. During the artillery shelling and bombing, many were killed and wounded civilians(including ethnic Russians)

On December 31, 1994, the united group of forces began the assault on Grozny. Approximately 250 units of armored vehicles entered the city, which were extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops turned out to be poorly prepared: interaction and coordination were not established between various units, many soldiers did not lack combat experience, in addition, the armed forces of the Russian Federation did not have closed communication channels, which allowed the enemy to intercept negotiations

In January 1995, the Russian troops changed their tactics: instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, maneuverable airborne assault groups, supported by artillery and aviation, were mainly involved. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny. By the end of January, despite a successful offensive, the combined group of troops controlled only a third of the republic's capital. By the beginning of February, the number of UGVs was increased to 70 thousand people.

On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the UGA Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, to conclude a temporary truce. The parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and under the terms of the armistice, both sides were given the opportunity to take out the dead and wounded from the streets of Grozny. In fact, the truce was violated by both sides

In February 1995, the Yug group was formed in the UGV, and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the southern side began. By the end of the month, street fighting still continued in the city, but the Chechen units were gradually retreating. In the end, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the field commander Shamil Basayev (pictured) retreated from Chernorechye, the last region of Grozny controlled by separatists, and the city came under the control of Russian troops.

Then, in March 1995, after the capture of the city by Russian troops in Grozny, a pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov. As a result of the assault, the capital of Chechnya was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.

After the storming of Grozny, the main task of the united group of forces was to establish control over the plains of Chechnya. The Russian side began intensive negotiations with the local population of the republic, urging residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian combat units occupied dominant heights over villages and cities. Thus, at the end of March 1995, Argun, Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight. A characteristic feature of these victories was that the militant detachments were not destroyed and freely left the settlements.

Major battles in the first Chechen war were the battle for the village of Bamut and the operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in the village of Samashki. On April 7-8, 1995, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinskaya Brigade of Internal Troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoi-Martanovsky District of Chechnya). It is believed that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called Abkhaz battalion of Shamil Basayev). Street fighting began in the village. According to a number of international organizations (including the UN Commission on Human Rights), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.

On March 10, 1995, protracted and fierce battles began for the village of Bamut. The core of the Chechen defense of the village was made up of 100 fighters under the command of Khizir Khachukayev. The approaches to Bamut and its main streets were densely mined with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. On April 15-16, Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on its outskirts. But soon the UGV fighters were forced to leave Bamut, since the militants managed to occupy the dominant heights, they also used the old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aviation. Fights for Bamut continued until June 1995 and were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk

From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced the suspension of hostilities on its part. The offensive was resumed only on May 12. Despite the significant superiority in manpower and equipment, the Russian troops got bogged down in the enemy's defense. Just as in the lowland areas, the militants were not defeated: they were able to leave the abandoned settlements and transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions.

On June 14-19, 1995, a group of Chechen militants of 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, attacked Budennovsk, followed by the seizure of a hospital and hostages - 1600 residents of the city. The terrorists' demands were the end of hostilities in Chechnya and the beginning of negotiations between the Russian authorities and the regime of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Thanks to the storming of the hospital by special forces on June 17, 61 hostages were released. After negotiations on June 19, the militants released the remaining hostages, the Russian authorities agreed to an end to the military operation in Chechnya, and the terrorists were allowed to return to Chechnya. The terrorist attack killed 129 people, 415 people were injured

After the terrorist attack in Budennovsk, from June 19 to June 22, 1995, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. From June 27 to June 30, the second stage of negotiations took place in the capital of Chechnya, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the detachments of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the withdrawal of Russian troops and free elections... At the same time, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides, and local battles took place throughout the republic.

On December 14-17, 1995, elections were held in Chechnya - with a large number of violations, but nevertheless recognized as valid. Supporters of the separatists announced in advance about boycotting and non-recognition of the elections. The election was won by a protege of the Russian authorities, the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Doku Zavgaev, having received over 90% of the votes. All servicemen of the united group of forces took part in the elections

Since the beginning of the first Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to liquidate the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) Dzhokhar Dudayev (pictured), but three attempts ended in failure. However, it was found out that Dudayev often uses a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system. On April 21, 1996, the special services tracked the signal of the satellite phone of the President of the CRI, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When Russian military aircraft reached their target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, destroying Dzhokhar Dudayev.

In 1996, despite some successes of the Russian armed forces (such as the elimination of Dzhokhar Dudaev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoe, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the first Chechen war began to take on a protracted nature. In the context of an imminent presidential election, the Russian authorities decided to once again negotiate with the separatists. On June 10, in Nazran (Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), disarming separatist detachments, and holding free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed

On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen militants numbering, according to various estimates, from 850 to 2 thousand people attacked Grozny. The Russian garrison under the command of General Konstantin Pulikovsky, despite the significant superiority in manpower and equipment, could not hold the city. According to a number of historians, it was the defeat of the Russian armed forces in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.

On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic", which caused a sharp aggravation of the situation in the republic: separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, blocked railway and air hubs. Three days after the introduction of the state of emergency, the state of emergency was thwarted, and the decree had to be canceled on November 11 - after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. At the same time, the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992.

In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev (pictured in the center) ordered to transfer to the Dudayevites half of all weapons and ammunition available in Chechnya. According to the minister, this was a forced step, because a significant part of the "transferred" weapons had already been seized, and it was not possible to take out the rest due to the lack of soldiers and echelons. In turn, at a meeting of the State Duma, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Government Oleg Lobov explained the appearance of a large number of weapons from residents of the Chechen Republic as follows: “You know that in 1991 a huge amount of weapons were partially transferred, and partially - and mainly - seized by force during the withdrawal of troops from the Chechen Republic. It was a period of reorganization. The number of these weapons is estimated at tens of thousands of units, and they are scattered throughout the Chechen Republic, buried in residential buildings, forests and caves "

The eastern grouping of the UGV was blocked by local residents in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, however, using force, it nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok grouping advanced the most successfully: on December 12, it approached the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny

A new offensive by the units of the united group of forces began on December 19, 1994. The Vladikavkaz (western) grouping blocked Grozny from the west, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) grouping occupied Dolinsky and blockaded Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and the paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. Thus, in the first days of hostilities, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.

In mid-December 1994, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19, the first bombing strike was made on the city center. Many civilians (including ethnic Russians) were killed and wounded in artillery shelling and bombing.

On March 10, 1995, protracted and fierce battles began for the village of Bamut. The core of the Chechen defense of the village was made up of 100 fighters under the command of Khizir Khachukayev. The approaches to Bamut and its main streets were densely mined with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. On April 15-16, Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on its outskirts. But soon the UGV fighters were forced to leave Bamut, since the militants managed to occupy the commanding heights, they also used the old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aviation. Fights for Bamut continued until June 1995 and were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk

After the terrorist attack in Budennovsk, from June 19 to June 22, 1995, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. From June 27 to June 30, the second stage of negotiations took place in the capital of Chechnya, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners "all for all", the disarmament of the detachments of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections. At the same time, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides, and local battles took place throughout the republic.

On August 31, 1996, in Khasavyurt, a Dagestan regional center on the border with Chechnya, the secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and the chief of staff of Chechen fighters Aslan Maskhadov signed the documents that put an end to the first Chechen war - the Khasavyurt agreements. Military operations were ended, federal troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, and the question of the status of the territory was postponed until December 31, 2001.

In the fall of 1991, the leadership of Chechnya declared its state sovereignty and the republic's secession from the RSFSR and the USSR. Over the next three years, the authorities in Chechnya were dissolved, the laws of the Russian Federation were revoked, the formation of the Chechen armed forces began, headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, President of the Republic, General of the Soviet Army Dzhokhar Dudayev.

(Military encyclopedia. Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission S.B. Ivanov. Military Publishing. Moscow. In 8 volumes 2004. ISBN 5 203 01875 - 8)

On December 9, 1994, Yeltsin signed a decree "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict." On December 11, when Russian troops crossed the administrative border with the Chechen Republic, an operation began to restore constitutional order in Chechnya.

Military operations in the republic lasted for about two years.

The losses of the federal forces in the first Chechen war were, according to official data, 4.103 thousand killed, 1.906 thousand missing, 19.794 thousand wounded.

After two years of hostilities, terrorist attacks, raids by militants and after the death of Chechen President Dudaev, the Khasavyurt agreements were signed.

The signing of the Khasavyurt agreements took place a month after the presidential elections, which were won by the incumbent President Boris Yeltsin.

The signatures under the Khasavyurt peace were put by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and the chief of staff of the armed formations of the separatists Aslan Maskhadov, the head of the OSCE Assistance Group in the Chechen Republic Tim Guldiman was present at the signing ceremony.

The documents indicated the principles for defining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic. The parties committed themselves not to resort to the use of force or the threat of force, and to proceed from the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The key points of the settlement were contained in a special protocol. Chief among them is the "postponed status" clause: the question of the status of Chechnya was to be resolved before December 31, 2001. A joint commission of representatives of the state authorities of Russia and Chechnya was to deal with the solution of operational problems. The tasks of the commission, in particular, included monitoring the implementation of Boris Yeltsin's decree on the withdrawal of troops, preparing proposals for restoring monetary, financial and budgetary relations between Moscow and Grozny, as well as a program for restoring the republic's economy.

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, Chechnya became de facto an independent state, but de jure - a state not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

In October 1996, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution "On the situation in the Chechen Republic", according to which the documents signed on August 31, 1996 in the city of Khasavyurt were considered "evidence of the willingness of the parties to resolve the conflict peacefully, having no state and legal significance."

93 State Duma deputies submitted a request to the Constitutional Court about the constitutionality of the Khasavyurt agreements. In December 1996, the Constitutional Court refused to accept for consideration the request of a group of deputies due to the lack of jurisdiction of the issues raised in it to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.

The Khasavyurt agreements and the subsequent conclusion of an agreement on peace and principles of relations between The Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria ", which was signed by Boris Yeltsin and Aslan Maskhadov, did not lead to a stabilization of the situation in the region. almost the entire non-Chechen population left or was physically destroyed.

In 1999, Chechen armed formations invaded Dagestan, after which both sides finally ceased to comply with the provisions of the Khasavyurt agreements. The second Chechen campaign began. The counter-terrorist operation regime was introduced in the republic, which lasted almost 10 years and was canceled only on April 16, 2009.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources