Russians in Kosovo. Pristina throw. Russia's Stolen Victory. War in Yugoslavia

On the night of June 11-12, an advance detachment of the Airborne Forces from the Russian peacekeeping contingent SFOR moved out of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the direction of Kosovo.
The task is to capture the airport "Slatina", located 15 km away. from Pristina, was completed by 7 am, checkpoints were set up, and the runway was prepared to receive the main forces. The operation was being prepared since May, when Major Yunus-bek Yevkurov, with a group of 18 GRU servicemen, secretly moved towards the airport (the details of this part of the operation are still classified).

NATO columns approached the airport at about 11 a.m. on June 12, 1999, and within a few hours the probability of a direct collision was extremely high. So 200 Russian paratroopers thwarted NATO's plans to use a key airport with a runway capable of receiving any type of aircraft, including heavy military transport.

History, of course, does not know the subjunctive mood. But if the plans that were built or supported by General Leonid Ivashov were destined to come true, the world would definitely be different now ...

- Leonid Grigorievich, is it true that a certain French major gave the Serbs information about NATO bombings?

- Chief of the General Staff of the French Armed Forces, General of the Army Jean-Pierre Kelsh, with whom I have the best relations, was also not a supporter of the bombing of Yugoslavia. By the way, like many military men from other NATO countries. Therefore, in the case of the French major, there is nothing surprising. It wasn't money that played a role here. This was a courageous and highly humane act, because there was no reason to bomb Yugoslavia.

But Albright again! When British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook only hinted that his lawyers would never approve of the ultimatum presented to Belgrade and would not support the bombing plan, Albright was ready to advise: "Hire other lawyers!" This is how American politics is done ...

On the tenth anniversary of the bombing, de Gaulle's former adviser, General Pierre Galois, sent a video of his speech to Belgrade, in which he revealed some NATO secrets. As it turns out, the conspiracy against Yugoslavia has existed for a long time. In the mid-eighties, the World Bank held two meetings, which concluded that Yugoslavia, where there is no unemployment, free education, medicine and high dynamics of economic growth, is not the best example for Europe. According to Galois, the military in Germany, England, France and the United States even then thought about how to organize subversive activities against Yugoslavia. And if necessary, then a military operation.

- And Moscow turned out to be not the most reliable ally of Belgrade.

- At the talks on Yugoslavia, our delegation was headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin as a special representative, and Strobe Talbot was the head of the American one. The military began the dialogue, and we managed to agree on many things. For example, that the troops of those states that participated in the bombing will not enter Kosovo, and the Yugoslav border guards will work on the border together with NATO border structures. And the most important thing is that under this agreement Russia received several sectors at once under its responsibility in Kosovo, where mostly Serbs lived. Which was quite logical.

After I reported on the results, Chernomyrdin even rebuked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who in dialogue with Strobe Talbot froze at a standstill. "We need to build up!" - says ... The process was really delayed there, so I was somewhat surprised when in the evening Chernomyrdin suddenly said: "Leonid Grigorievich, you and General Zavarzin go to rest, and we will still work." As I later found out, at night Talbot arranged a telephone conversation with Chernomyrdin with Albert Gore, and in the morning Viktor Stepanovich behaved completely differently.

The plenary session opens, Strobe Talbot rises and declares that the American side has a new text of the agreement, which is proposed to be discussed. Viktor Stepanovich agrees. Naturally, I was indignant: how can you discuss a text that we have not seen in our eyes? I propose to return to Moscow, carefully study the new option and give an answer to the American side in the next round. The last word is for the head of the delegation, but Viktor Stepanovich is even quite complacent: come on, he says, we will still listen to Talbot, only in Russian translation. I insist: "Viktor Stepanovich, we listen to Talbot, get on the plane and fly to Moscow." “We’ll see where we are flying ...” Chernomyrdin retorts, as I sensed, already with irritation.

Talbot begins to read out his version, and when it turns out that all our agreements with the American military have been thrown out, I interrupt him and ask General Fogelson for an explanation. He reports: for everything that was previously agreed upon, the consent of the Pentagon was obtained. And then Chernomyrdin asks Talbot: "Strobe, are we going to listen to our military?" - "No, Victor Stepanovich!" - "Then let's move on ..." And then Chernomyrdin accepted the American side's version.

Naturally, I protested against this method of negotiating, and also stated my categorical disagreement with the text of the agreement. Then General Zavarzin and I left the meeting room. Already at our embassy on a private communication, I asked Marshal Sergeev to report everything to President Yeltsin. The second call informed the Yugoslav side ...

Then there were rumors that Chernomyrdin and I even had a fight. The fight was really tough, but it didn't come to a fight. It was like this. General Zavarzin and I arrived earlier and were accommodated in the second cabin of the plane. Chernomyrdin, meanwhile, was giving interviews at the gangway. After a while he climbs aboard and right from the door: "Hey, general, come on in - we'll figure it out!" I didn't want to talk at all, but Zavarzin convinced me. All the same, I went to his salon and first of all asked him to address me as written in our regulations: "Comrade Colonel General" or "Colonel General Ivashov." "Let's see if you will be a general when we arrive in Moscow!" - said Chernomyrdin, but, I see, he no longer pokes. And then I say: "You betrayed the interests of Russia, you betrayed the interests of the Serbs, you betrayed the directive of President Yeltsin and even the G8 principles ..."

There was a directive from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approved by Yeltsin, on the conduct of negotiations, which determined our positions. There was an agreement with the G8 foreign ministers on the principles of the international military presence in Kosovo. It was all smeared out. And when I gave it all out in plain text, Chernomyrdin boiled terribly: "What are these G8 principles I betrayed?" I clarify: "The agreement with the Americans does not even mention these principles." He then turns to the Foreign Ministry: "Ivanovsky, is it really not?" He replies: "No, Viktor Stepanovich!" Chernomyrdin seemed to burst out: "Where were you looking? .." But it was too late to make noise. According to the version of the agreement that he signed, not only did we not have our own sector in Kosovo, Russia was generally excluded from the peacekeeping process.

- What happened?

- We discussed this issue with Marshal Sergeev. Then I received reliable information about what Gor and Chernomyrdin were talking about at night. The fact is that even earlier they met at the Villa Gore in America and allegedly agreed that Albert Gore would be nominated for the presidency of the United States, and Viktor Stepanovich - for the presidency of Russia. At the same time, the United States, represented by incumbent President Bill Clinton and his party associate Albert Gore, promised Chernomyrdin support ...

But how do you manage this information? I showed it to Marshal Sergeev. He says: "Leave it with me." - "Why?" - "There will be an opportunity, I will report to Boris Nikolaevich." - “And if this is their joint project? Then you will go to report as the Minister of Defense, and on the way back you will already be removed ... ”In general, I convinced Igor Dmitrievich not to risk it. The situation in the country was specific. The most important information was obtained, but there was no one to report it! Moreover, it was dangerous to report. And personally, and because our sources could be jeopardized.

- Was the date of the start of the bombing of Yugoslavia known?

- We all knew. And the intelligence knew, and our colleagues from NATO, who did not like all this, warned us in advance. The Department of Defense has developed three options for response. The toughest one is the rupture of diplomatic relations with those NATO countries that are participating in the bombing. The second option is to end cooperation with NATO in all areas, to limit the activities of military attachés, and to end all contacts with them. And the third, the mildest one: the number of joint contacts, events, and so on is decreasing. Marshal Sergeev decided to start with the second option. We recalled our mission from NATO, returned home all those who studied in the countries of the alliance, and expelled all NATO infrastructures from Russia, including the NATO information bureau. Any contact with military attachés was ruled out. Which was taken very painfully. The French military attaché even promised to go on a hunger strike if I didn’t accept him. I didn’t accept.

- What did he want to achieve by this?

- In Europe, the bombing was perceived ambiguously. If Russia responded more gently, the Americans would have an opportunity to explain themselves to the European public and convince their layman that the Russians, they say, do not really mind. In addition, after our reaction to the bombing, they also had a purely bureaucratic problem. As one NATO general told me, certain sums were allocated for contacts with Russia, which in Brussels did not know how to write off.

- Who in the country's leadership shared your position on Yugoslavia?

- One hundred percent - Marshal Sergeev and Yevgeny Primakov. But in May, Yevgeny Maksimovich was removed from the post of prime minister and could no longer influence events. And after his departure, the Foreign Ministry no longer had its position and generally lost all independence in decision-making.

- How serious was the resistance of the Yugoslav army?

- According to NATO data, after the bombing, about half of the Kosovo grouping of the Yugoslav army was considered destroyed. But when the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from the province of Kosovo began, it became clear to everyone that NATO intelligence was lying. The Serbs left without loss, fully retaining their combat capability and military equipment. The air defense and air force suffered serious losses. The ground constellation has retained its potential.

Why didn't NATO venture into a ground operation? The main reason is that in Brussels they feared great losses. The second reason is that there were no candidates for action in the first echelon. As far as I know, the Germans flatly refused immediately. The British and the Americans also did not express their desire. Then the Hungarians were almost assigned to the first echelon, who did not expect such a catch. In general, no one wanted to fight seriously. And the last reason is that in the course of the ground operation, civilians could suffer, including the Kosovars, to whose rescue NATO was allegedly seeking. As a result, international resonance is highly undesirable for Brussels.

Thanks to our Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, there is no mention of NATO in UN Security Council resolution 1244. Its text sounds approximately like this: UN members and international organizations will take part in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. No matter how hard Albright tried, NATO fell into this vague formulation - “international organizations”. Incidentally, the Americans at the G8 talks again very much counted on Chernomyrdin's support. And he did call, but this time with an appeal "Not to concede Russian positions!" Resolution 1244 completely untied our hands, and we could act as we saw fit. But in order to avoid conflicts, they offered the Americans to come to an agreement.

Strobe Talbot and General Fogelson flew to Moscow with a proposal that our battalion should be located in the American sector and obey the Americans. Then they wrote that I had thrown this document back to Vogelson. It was not so, I simply did not accept it and offered my partners to learn from Resolution 1244. Half an hour later, another American proposal came in: our presence had already increased to two battalions, which were assigning the commander of the British group, General Michael Jackson, to the mobile reserve. That is, where they will send. But since we had an ironclad principle regarding NATO - we act together, but we do not obey! - none of the options was accepted. I broke off the negotiations, and when the Americans asked how we were going to act now, I answered honestly: on my own! And he clarified for the press: we will not be the first to enter Kosovo, but we will not be the last either.

The Americans went to the hotel, and we sat in the office of the first deputy foreign minister and prepared a note to Yeltsin, in which they noted that the American proposals humiliate both Russia and him personally as president. Referring to Resolution 1244, which allows us to act at our discretion, we proposed to bring our forces into Kosovo simultaneously with NATO forces, but without coordination with them. When the document was endorsed, Marshal Sergeev went to see Yeltsin and received his approval. Now we could act.

- And our battalion went to Pristina ...

- Strobe Talbot halfway back to Moscow. Not knowing what to do with the Americans, Igor Ivanov brought the American delegation to Arbat Square, and there they pushed around the floor of the Minister of Defense, demanding explanations. Talbot, who was informed about the entry of our battalion into Pristina, demanded an explanation, but Igor Ivanov could not tell him anything. Then he was offended that we did not inform him of our intentions. But we were afraid of information leakage, so only the military were aware of all the details of the march to Pristina.

- They say that when our battalion entered Pristina, a pre-war panic began in the capitals of the world.

- Everything was calm with us until General Zavarzin reported that the commander of the British brigade operating in the same sector was asking for a meeting with him. Such a meeting was allowed, although we did not rule out provocations. And an hour and a half later, when a secret connection was established, I myself went to Zavarzin. He reported that the British, in principle, are normal men, but do not trust anyone - neither the Serbs, nor the Albanians, nor their Nepalese riflemen, so five senior British officers are asking permission to spend the night at our location. Well what can you say? Allowed. Allowed and a glass. The British have three each, Zavarzin one.

This is how the interaction began. Although on the second day, the British still tried to put pressure on the psyche. A British sergeant approaches and says that he has an order to drive his tank through our position, and he cannot but carry out this order. Then our sergeant calls the grenade launcher and says that an order has been given to shoot at any object that crosses the line of the post. At the same time, he showed where the grenade would enter the British armor, and where it would fly from. The incident was over. The English sergeant left and never returned.

In general, we planned to bring in three battalions. One was supposed to go to Kosovska Mitrovica and, as it were, mark our sector. They wanted to land the second at the airfield in Pristina. And the third, as a reserve, was supposed to land on Serbian territory near the city of Nis. But, if you remember, the Hungarians and Romanians did not allow us to fly through their airspace. Therefore, the battalion, which was supposed to go to Mitrovica, turned to Pristina.

We did not rule out that NATO might use weapons. But I gave Marshal Sergeev three counterarguments. First, in order to make a decision to start hostilities against Russia, you need to get the consent of the NATO Council. With regard to the bombing, the Americans managed to twist the arms of their partners, but the war with Russia is something completely different. The second argument is that if the Americans do insist, they will need at least a few meetings, which is a gain in time when additional measures can be taken. And third: if the situation escalated, we were to fly to Belgrade with one respected general to deploy the Yugoslav armed forces in the Kosovo direction. One word was enough for the Serbs to support our battalion with all their forces and means. I knew their moods. "This is the most important argument!" - said Marshal Sergeev and gave permission to act.

At the same time, I do not know which NATO member was eager to fight with us. After all, how did the events develop? When our battalion entered Kosovo, my colleague flew in from Germany and, bypassing NATO, suggested creating a joint Russian-German brigade - two battalions on each side. The Italians, they even gave us their sector at full disposal. By the way, it was swampy, the most uncomfortable.

But what happened was: indeed, Washington, through the commander of the combined forces of NATO in Europe, Wesley Clark, put pressure on British General Michael Jackson to try to squeeze our battalion out of Pristina by force of arms. Jackson writes about this in his book. But I think that the British military not only Clark, but also Tony Blair would not have obeyed. As for the joint Russian-German brigade, we seriously studied this issue. But the Americans stirred up the Albanians, who staged massive protests against the entry of our units into the German sector.

Since they continue to accuse me of almost unleashing a third world war at that time, I want to clarify: we acted strictly within the international legal framework outlined by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided equal rights to us, the Americans and NATO.

- Did you have official support from Moscow?

- There was a very interesting situation in Russia then. The president seemed to be ill, the government headed by Stepashin had just been formed, and with reduced powers, and since there were no other strong political centers in the country, the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry often acted at their own peril and risk. But this time Yeltsin's agreement in principle was received, which might not have been known, for example, TV presenter Yevgeny Kiselev, who had already prepared a program about how the generals allegedly deceived Yeltsin. It so happened that practically no one knew that the president was in the know from the very beginning.

And here is a meeting at Yeltsin's the next day after the entry of our battalion. Naturally, no one shakes hands with Marshal Sergeev, they turn up their noses from him. Igor Dmitrievich makes a detailed report and mentions that the command of the British brigade asked us to stay for the night. And suddenly Yeltsin's voice: "Have you poured a glass?" - "Of course, Boris Nikolayevich ..." In general, Yeltsin ended up hugging Sergeev and thanking him for "hitting Clinton on the nose." And even then all the others joined in the congratulations. Everyone suddenly became complicit.

- They say there was a holiday in NATO when it became known about your resignation.

- Strobe Talbot writes that he congratulated his generals on this. By the way, even earlier, in May 2001, after a regular meeting of the Russia-NATO Council, Lord Robertson invited our delegation to his office, handed me cufflinks with NATO and Russia symbols, a bottle of whiskey and said that this was in memory of our cooperation, which "It was not always pleasant, but always constructive." That is, they knew in advance that I was leaving. On the way back, on the way back, I asked Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov what all this meant. He: “Well, what are you! It's so nice to work with you ... ”But I understood that Sergei Borisovich was disingenuous, because NATO information about our internal affairs could be trusted.

However, there was a case when they a little hastened to say goodbye to me. At the next round of negotiations, my counterpart, General Fogelson, in the presence of Madeleine Albright, expressed doubt that I would agree with the proposals they had prepared. And then Albright flared up: "I am not negotiating with General Ivashov!" And then she dropped the phrase: "Do not place a big bet on Marshal Sergeev and General Ivashov, very soon Yeltsin will remove them."

Indeed, after our disagreements on the Yugoslav question, Chernomyrdin came to Yeltsin with a draft decree on my resignation. As I was later told, Yeltsin refused to sign the decree, and with the comment: “I will not shoot. Let him wet them! "

- When you defended Milosevic in The Hague, did you have to meet with Carla del Ponte?

- No, I didn't have to. There, a trial group was formed for each accused. Besides me, Evgeny Primakov and Nikolai Ryzhkov testified in favor of the President of Yugoslavia. But I was the only witness who testified for two days in a row. In particular, on the first day, I talked about two intercepted telephone conversations between Madeleine Albright and Hashim Thaci. Even before the main events, he somehow recklessly declared that, they say, on the territory of Kosovo, except for the Albanians, there would be no one - neither NATO, nor Serbs. Albright, then she called from Germany, picked up the phone and gave the unreasonable Kosovar leader the first number. Their next conversation took place on March 25, 1999, on the second day after the start of the bombing. This time Albright got in touch from the United States. “Where is your rebellion,” she shouted into the phone, “why don’t you raise a rebellion?” When I brought up these facts, the judges widened their eyes.

But the next day, the composition of the court was darker than a cloud. Apparently, an explanatory work had already been carried out with them, and the representative of the British Themis strongly demanded that I explain on what basis the telephone of the US Secretary of State was tapped. I believe that my answer disappointed him even more. I said that we were not tracking Albright's calls, but the conversations of bandits and terrorists, and if she contacted them, it was not our fault ...

- Do you think that the death of President Milosevic in the cell was not accidental?

- Of course. First, the process was not in favor of NATO. Secondly, Slobodan was not broken. Any of his statements in court had an attacking character. They did not know how to stop the flow of the information that Milosevic was giving out. And you can kill in different ways. For example, the provision of the wrong assistance, which is required for medical reasons, untimely provision or no assistance at all. Preparing for the trial, I spent many hours in Milosevic's cell, and he told me that the pills he was given in prison reduce blood pressure, but have strange side effects: memory deteriorates, speech slows down, his head does not work ... that this is no coincidence.

- What could have been a court decision in the case of the ex-President of Yugoslavia?

- My friend General Oidanich, whom I also defended, without personal participation - this was not allowed by the tribunal, they were given sixteen years in prison. Slobodan Milosevic could have been sentenced to life in prison, that is, he would have been killed anyway. No acquittal was possible, because then NATO, the Hague Tribunal, the Kosovo Liberation Army would have been charged ...

In the early 90s, Andrei Kozyrev was appointed head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who went down in history as "Mr. Yes" - a counterbalance to "Mr. No" Andrei Gromyko. But after a few years, the situation began to change. The first significant confrontation was the conflict in Kosovo.

In 1999, NATO threatens Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic with a fist. There is virtually a civil war in his country. Serbs are fighting Albanians for the edge of Kosovo. Some, whom Belgrade calls separatists, want the independence of the region, while others - the official authorities - are in favor of the country's inviolability. NATO blames the Serbs for all the troubles, and starts bombing on March 24.

Having violated all the norms of international law, and not listening to Russia, which stands for peace talks, NATO launches an air attack. After it was calculated, within a few months of the operation, the name of which is "Allied Force", more than a hundred industrial enterprises were destroyed in Serbia. Aviation flew 35 thousand sorties and fired more than 20 thousand bombs and missiles. Almost 2 thousand civilians and 400 children were killed. But this day went down in history as the day when "only aviation won the war." The NATO military lost only two people - by accident.

Evgeny Barmyantsev in 1999 acted as a military attaché at the Russian Embassy in Yugoslavia. He claims that NATO could not take Kosovo with their bare hands, so they made an air attempt. When discussing Operation Allied Force, Russia was not mentioned as a participant in the operation. In these conditions, the top political and military leadership decided to carry out an operation to outstrip NATO forces and occupy the airfield.

Passive participation
AOK (UÇK)

March on Pristina- the operation to transfer the combined battalion of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Armed Forces, which was part of the international peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the city of Uglevik), to the city of Pristina (Kosovo and Metohija), carried out on the night of June 12, 1999.

The aim of the operation was to establish control over the airport "Slatina" (now - Pristina International Airport) before the British division of KFOR.

In the West, the operation is known as Incident in Pristina (Pristina incident).

Background

Preparing for the march to Pristina

According to the position of Russia, in order to indicate its presence in world politics, as well as to ensure its geopolitical interests in the Balkan region, the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, with the consent of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, decided to occupy the Slatina airport and enter to the territory of Kosovo and Metohija of the Russian peacekeeping contingent.

At a meeting with the First Deputy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Alexander Avdeev, they concluded:

In the development of the plan, in addition to Avdeev, participated: A.N. Alekseev, Deputy Director of the Department of European Cooperation of the Russian Foreign Ministry, General Yevgeny Barmyantsev, military attaché in Belgrade, Lieutenant General Viktor Zavarzin, officers of the General Staff's Main Directorate and the GRU, and other military personnel.

According to Leonid Ivashov, who held the post at that time Head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Defense, not only in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not know about the impending operation. In the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the airborne troops, literally a few knew about this. And only six people knew the full extent of the entire operation, including the military-diplomatic cover. Even President Yeltsin was provided with an analytical note with generalized proposals, rather than specific actions to take the airport.

In the event of an attack on Russian paratroopers by NATO forces, it was planned to hastily conduct blitz negotiations with the military and political leadership of Yugoslavia, join a military alliance with Yugoslavia and repulse the advancing NATO troops throughout Kosovo, while simultaneously transferring several regiments to Kosovo and Metohija Airborne Forces, up to the division. According to General L. Ivashov, such a development of events would have been doomed to success from the outset, since the NATO leadership was not fully prepared for a full-scale ground operation.

On June 10, 1999, the NATO military operation ended. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, NATO peacekeeping forces were deployed in Kosovo.

The establishment of control over the Slatina airfield and the entry of NATO peacekeeping forces into Kosovo were scheduled for 12 June. The main NATO ground forces were concentrated in Macedonia and prepared to march towards Kosovo on the morning of 12 June.

June 10 to the Russian peacekeeping contingent SFOR (subdivisions of the Russian Airborne Forces), located in Bosnia and Herzegovina, received an order to prepare a mechanized column and an advance detachment of up to 200 people.

The advance detachment and the convoy, which included armored personnel carriers, Ural and UAZ vehicles, were prepared as soon as possible. At the same time, the personnel (except for command), who was supposed to participate in the march, until the very last moment did not know where and why they were preparing to perform.

Start of operation

Transfer of the Russian KFOR contingent: March 12, 1999 to Pristina Air route. Transfer of paratroopers from Pskov, Ryazan and Ivanov Sea route. Transfer of paratroopers and equipment from Tula

On June 11 at 4:00 (according to other sources, the readiness for the start of the movement was scheduled for 5 a.m., and the movement began at 11 a.m.) the forward detachment of the Airborne Forces in armored personnel carriers and vehicles moved towards the border of Bosnia and Yugoslavia. The senior operational group of the Russian Airborne Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina was commanded by Major General Valery Rybkin and the battalion commander Colonel Sergei Pavlov. On the territory of Serbia, Lieutenant General Zavarzin, appointed from the General Staff, joined the column. We walked fast - under 80 km / h. The column crossed the border without difficulty. Until that moment, the NATO command did not have information about the start of the Russian paratroopers' march on Pristina.

Even before crossing the border, the marking of Russian military and transport equipment was changed from "SFOR" to "KFOR". The personnel were tasked to overcome more than 600 kilometers in the shortest possible time and capture the Slatina airfield before the arrival of NATO forces. Russian flags were hung on armored personnel carriers and vehicles.

Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Anatoly Kvashnin, for command and staff communications of the Bosnian brigade, ordered Viktor Zavarzin to immediately deploy the battalion in the opposite direction. Zavarzin, in turn, reported this to Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, chief of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The latter reminded him that “The decision to enter the battalion was made by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - the President of Russia, and the order was given by the Minister of Defense<…>Therefore, no turns and stops - only forward "... To save Zavarzin from new unauthorized orders, Ivashov suggested that he turn off his mobile phone for a while. Soon Kvashnin tried to re-transmit the order to stop the battalion through the brigade headquarters (the command-staff vehicle had its own communication equipment), but Zavarzin, taking full responsibility for himself, continued to move on.

When the battalion reached the border with Kosovo almost a day later, it slowed down, as it was planned, and crossed the administrative border of Serbia with Kosovo at night on June 12 only after NATO special forces (intelligence, communications and others) crossed the Macedonian border with Kosovo. By this time, they already knew about the promotion of Russian paratroopers in Brussels.

The movement of the convoy of Russian troops in Yugoslavia was met with ambiguity by the local population. During the passage through the territory of Serbia, including the territory of Kosovo, the population happily greeted Russian soldiers, throwing flowers at the equipment, handing over food and drinks, in connection with which the movement of the column slightly slowed down. However, later, in Kosovo itself, confrontations began with supporters of the independence of the region.

The convoy of Russian paratroopers arrived in Pristina at about 2 am on 12 June. The population of the city took to the streets to meet the convoy, while firecrackers, light flares were used, and machine gun fires were heard somewhere. The column passed through Pristina in 1.5 hours. Immediately beyond Pristina, the convoy entered Kosovo Pole, where it stopped for a short time to clarify tasks and obtain information from intelligence.

During the advance of the column, numerous retreating units of the Serbian army met. The paratroopers in the shortest possible time seized all the premises of the Slatina airport, took up a perimeter defense, organized checkpoints and prepared for the appearance of the first NATO columns, which were already on the way. The task of capturing the airport "Slatina" was completed by 7 o'clock in the morning on June 12. By this time, the last forces of the Serbian army (bombers and tanks) were leaving the airport and left after 20 minutes.

CNN broadcasted the Russian battalion's deployment to Pristina live.

Arrival of the British armored column

On June 12, 1999, at about 11:00, an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft appeared in the sky over the airfield, then from the checkpoint at the entrance to the Slatina airport, the battalion command received a message about the arrival of the first convoy of NATO forces. They were British jeeps. On the other side, the British Chieftain tanks were approaching the airfield.

Both columns stopped in front of Russian checkpoints. Landing helicopters appeared in the sky. The pilots of British helicopters made several attempts to land at the airfield, but these attempts were thwarted by the crews of Russian armored personnel carriers. As soon as the helicopter came in for landing, an APC immediately rushed towards it, thus preventing its maneuver. Unsuccessful, the British pilots flew away.

Subsequently, the famous British singer James Blunt, who served in the NATO group in 1999, testified about the order of General Clark to recapture the airfield from the Russian paratroopers. Blunt said he would not shoot the Russians, even under the threat of a tribunal. In addition, Blunt said:

“About 200 Russians were stationed at the airfield ... The direct order of General Wesley Clark was to 'suppress them.' Clarke used expressions that were unusual for us. For example, "destroy". There were political reasons for the seizure of the airfield. But the practical consequence would be an attack on the Russians. "

In the end, the commander of the British group in the Balkans, Michael Jackson said that "Will not allow his soldiers to unleash a third world war"... He gave the command "Surround the airfield instead of attack" .

Having made a march, the Russian battalion was left without supplies, hoping to get it by air by aircraft. Once surrounded, the Russians, according to the same Blunt, a couple of days later said: “Look, we have no food or water left. Maybe we can share the airfield? "... However, it is known that the situation with hot meals for the Russian battalion was adjusted earlier than that of the British.

V. V. Putin accompanied by Russian paratroopers at the site of the airport "Slatina", June 2001

According to the plan of the operation, after the capture of the Slatina airport, military transport aircraft of the Russian Air Force were to land on it soon, which were to transfer at least two regiments of the Airborne Forces and heavy military equipment. However, Hungary (a NATO member) and Bulgaria (a NATO ally) refused to grant Russia an air corridor, as a result of which 200 paratroopers were practically left alone for several days with all the arriving NATO forces.

According to the head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of Russia in 1996-2001, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, it was planned to enter three battalions:

Negotiation and consensus

For several days, negotiations between Russia and NATO (represented by the United States) at the level of foreign and defense ministers were held in Helsinki (Finland). All this time, Russian and British troops in the area of ​​the Slatina airport were not inferior to each other in anything, although a small delegation led by General Michael Jackson was admitted to the airport.

During difficult negotiations, the parties agreed to deploy a Russian military peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo within the areas controlled by Germany, France and the United States. Russia was not assigned a special sector for fear of NATO that this would lead to a de facto division of the province. At the same time, the airport "Slatina" was under the control of the Russian contingent, but was also to be used by NATO forces for the transfer of their armed forces and other needs.

During June - July 1999, several Il-76 military transport aircraft with a Russian peacekeeping contingent (Airborne Forces), military equipment and equipment arrived in Kosovo from the airfields in Ivanovo, Pskov and Ryazan. However, a larger number of Russian servicemen entered Kosovo along the sea route, unloading in the Greek port of Thessaloniki from large landing ships - Nikolai Filchenkov, Azov (BDK-54), Caesar Kunikov (BDK-64) and Yamal ( BDK-67), and later making a march in Kosovo through the territory of Macedonia.

Starting from October 15, 1999, the Slatina airport began to receive and send international passenger flights, having again received the status of an international airport.

Outcomes

The operation came as a complete surprise to NATO, disrupting the triumphant entry of NATO troops into Kosovo under the television cameras of the world media. The march on Pristina allowed Moscow to secure the deployment of its peacekeepers in the north of Kosovo. The historical significance of this military operation is very great - along with the famous U-turn of Yevgeny Primakov on March 24, 1999 over the Atlantic, it marked the beginning of Russia's transition to an independent foreign policy.

Peacekeepers from Russia were in Kosovo until 2003, when the Russian contingent (650 servicemen) was withdrawn from Kosovo, and its property was transferred to the command of the peacekeeping forces free of charge, and militia units from Russia arrived in return.

Reward

Participants of the "throw on Pristina" and the persons who participated in its preparation were awarded a specially established medal "To the participant of the March 12, 1999 Bosnia - Kosovo".

Reflection in culture

The composition "Song of the Kosovo Battalion" written by the participants in the events (music by D. Zubatenko, lyrics by S. Berezovsky

"Lord have mercy! Lord have mercy!" - the words of the Serbian folk song-prayer sounded at a concert in honor of the delegation of Russian paratroopers in the mining town of Uglevik in the east of the Republika Srpska, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A group of paratroopers from Russia, led by the former chief of staff of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Nikolai Staskov, arrived here to celebrate the 14th anniversary of the legendary airborne battalion's march in Kosovo. In June 1999, this news stirred the world - Russian troops seized Slatina airport, a key facility in Kosovo, right in front of the NATO vanguard. The Serbs perked up. The march of the airborne battalion in many Russians then aroused a sense of pride for the country and the army.

After 14 years, this date was hardly noticed in Russia, except for a couple of reports in the media. They "did not notice" it either in Belgrade, where today they are increasingly looking towards the West. But in the modest 18-thousandth Uglevik, where the headquarters of the brigade of Russian peacekeepers was located ten years ago, our paratroopers are remembered and loved. "Serbia is alive as long as Russia lives," - the quintessence of this memory was the words from the same song performed by Serbian girls ...

The Russian delegation was greeted by the chairman of the Serbian-Russian Union, Savo Cvetinovic, formerly one of the leaders of the Serbian police, and now a postal worker. Together with the officers of the Airborne Forces, he restored peace and order in the long-suffering land of the Republika Srpska. Loyalty to the oath, patriotism and pro-Russian orientation cost him a high position and a career in the police. He was too inconvenient for the henchmen from the international community, the "overseers" from the IPTF (international police), too honest, too inclined towards the Russian peacekeepers.
Tsvetinovich is one of those who do not change their views depending on the conjuncture. Now such people are in great deficit in Serbia, and in Russia as well. For him, Russian paratroopers are the dearest guests in the world.

Entity guard service

The acute phase of the conflict in the Balkans has been extinguished. Gradually, the wounds are healed, the heroes and traitors of that war, which broke out on the fragments of Yugoslavia and rolled through the fate of living people, families, friendships and the former unity of peoples, are becoming a thing of the past. Roads and skeletons of burnt and abandoned houses are overgrown with grass. Yugoslavia is no more, and, as the Serbs themselves say, there will be no more. The reasons and reasons for the disintegration of the country turned out to be much stronger and more effective than those fasteners that had sewn the SFRY since the time of Tito. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs, Muslims and Croats were divided into entities, isolating themselves in their territories, on opposite sides of the line of separation of the parties drawn by the international community.

Refugees settled in new houses, even moving the graves of their ancestors to housewarming. Today, there are much fewer towns and villages with a mixed population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although on the former demarcation line, Serbian villages still alternate with Muslim ones. In the 90s, when the fighting was going on, on sections of the roads that were shot from the commanding heights, local Serbs, fleeing from snipers, installed plywood shields along the roads and hung pieces of fabric and blankets on the ropes, blocking their view.

To the south, 600 kilometers southeast of Ugljevik, is the Kosovo Field, a historical place for Serbs, which in the 90s of the 20th century turned into a pain for the Serbian people. The tragedy of the Serb genocide of the 2000s was superimposed on the defeat in the battle with the Ottomans seven centuries ago.

... Memory relentlessly carries us back to the days of the 90s, when foreign military contingents were brought into Bosnia and Herzegovina. The political leadership of the leading world states, destroying what they saw as the “last bulwark of communism in Europe”, by their actions “torn apart” and tore apart the territory of the former Yugoslavia on religious and ethnic grounds, initiating one of the bloodiest conflicts of the 20th century. All this, of course, in the name of democracy and justice. The end justified the means ...

Serbs were left with less and less living space. The new reality was legalized by the Dayton Accords in December 1994.
At that time, the peacekeeping units of the Russian Airborne Forces were serving in the Republika Srpska, which, according to many of its residents, became a guarantee of the safety of the population and prevented new clashes. The task is to separate the opposing sides, seize, establish a peaceful life. In fact, the American military was on duty side by side with our paratroopers. It was unusual that potential adversaries, who had been preparing to fight each other for many years, carried out a peacekeeping mission as part of one organizational structure of the North multinational division, representing the interests of their countries in the region.

“We were enemies, but we met each other not on the battlefield, but as peacekeepers,” General Nikolai Staskov recalls. - An unusual state, given our preparation. Here they learned to communicate in a peaceful environment. We were gradually establishing interaction, although at first it was not easy. "

Former Chief of Staff of the Russian Airborne Forces Nikolai Staskov at the location of the headquarters of the Russian brigade of peacekeepers in Uglevik, Republika Srpska with a delegation of Russian paratroopers

A subdivision of American Rangers was stationed at the headquarters of the Russian Airborne Forces brigade, officers of the Russian interaction group in the interests of Russian peacekeepers performed tasks at the American Eagle base in Tuzla.

The attitude of the population to the peacekeepers was specific - the Americans were not liked here, to put it mildly, but they saw fraternal protection in the Russians. The trust of the population in our military, who served at the posts patrolling the area of ​​responsibility, according to Nikolai Staskov, then played a major role in the normalization of the situation. Shots no longer sounded, explosions thundered, people gradually returned to a peaceful life: "The friendship between the Russian and Serbian peoples, which is a constant, has affected."

The fact that the brigade of Russian paratroopers was firmly settled in the Republika Srpska, deploying, in addition to the headquarters, units, posts, also an operational group that independently analyzed information and transmitted it to Russia, did not like the American command, which demanded unconditional obedience. "Partners" constantly complained to Moscow about the initiative commanders of the Russian landing. For example, Western media accused General Staskov of almost breaking the Dayton Accords, calling him "a cannon without a fuse."

In January 1996, a separate 1,500-strong airborne brigade was sent to participate in the peacekeeping operation of the multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the night of June 11-12, 1999, a battalion of Russian paratroopers made a dashing rush from Bosnia to Kosovo in a few hours, capturing a strategically important object - the Slatina airfield and ahead of the tank columns of NATO troops. After that, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution No. 1244, on the basis of the decree of the President of Russia and in accordance with the "Agreed Points of Russian Participation in the KFOR Forces" signed by the Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation and the United States in Helsinki on June 18, 1999, a decision was made to send a military contingent of the Armed Forces to Kosovo. RF number of 3616 people.

The Russian Airborne Forces on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, together with NATO, participated in two peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. In BiH, paratroopers controlled an area with a total area of ​​1,750 km2. The total length of the controlled line of separation of the parties is 75 km. The units were deployed in 3 base areas (2 on the territory of the Republika Srpska - Uglevik and Priboy, 1 - on the territory of the Federation of BiH - Simin-Khan).

The bombs are real and psychological

... The time was vague - preparations were under way for the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, then the Kosovo events followed. In the spring of 1999, NATO bombers lined up in combat echelons to carry out (think about the term!) "Humanitarian bombing" of the infrastructure of Greater Serbia directly over the base area of ​​the Russian brigade. There is nothing to the border - less than 30 km.

Once the air carousel spun right in the sky over Uglevik, when the Yugoslav MiG took an unequal battle with two of the latest American fighters, was knocked out and, leaving a plume of smoke, began to go towards Serbia. The Serbian pilot managed to eject. He, wounded, was picked up by local residents and, after providing medical assistance, was transported across the border with Serbia. And on the ground, search groups of the American contingent scoured for several days, with the task of capturing the downed pilot.

A leaflet for Yugoslavian Armed Forces in KOSOVO, distributed by NATO aircraft in March-June 1999. Caption on the illustration: "Thousands of bombs ... obeying the will of the whole world will continually fall on your unit." Signature on the back: "Warning FRY AF: LEAVE KOSOVO! NATO uses B-52 bombers armed with 225-kg MK-82 bombs against units of the FRY Armed Forces in Kosovo and METOKHII. One B-52 can carry up to 50 such bombs! These aircraft will be fly until your atrocities stop and you are kicked out of KOSOVO and METOKHIYA. If you want to survive and see your families again, drop your weapon. "

At this time, the entire population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Republika Srpska, was subjected to active psychological pressure from Western countries. These places have become a kind of testing ground for "testing" new information technologies and their further application in other regions of the world. Thousands of American psychological warfare specialists have launched their work, creating media outlets, connecting local TV channels and radio stations, organizing talk shows, distributing leaflets, and so on. The psychological warfare officers from the Russian brigade resisted this flow, creating a different information background in the Serbian media, and often, according to the Americans themselves, they won these duels on air, on screens and newspaper strips.

With the intensification of the operation to squeeze the Serbs out of Kosovo, in addition to bombs, missiles and shells, leaflets with threats to bomb endlessly fell on Serbian troops and civilian objects from the air. The processing of the consciousness of the military people and the population did not stop for a minute. It can be said that in the Balkans, NATO forces won in the information sphere, since the damage inflicted from the air to the Yugoslav army in Kosovo was minimal.
Here, in practice, the strategy, tactics were worked out, the methodology and methods of waging information war were tested.

The scale of NATO's special operations is evidenced by the following fact - one day the wind suddenly changed, and one and a half million leaflets dropped on Serbia were carried to the territory of neighboring Hungary. Paper rain fell on the heads of the taken aback Hungarians. The leaflets read: “Thousands of bombs ... obeying the will of the whole world, will continually fall on your unit ... Warning of the FRY Armed Forces: leave Kosovo! NATO uses B-52 bombers armed with 225-kilogram MK-82 bombs against units of the FRY armed forces in Kosovo and Metohija. One B-52 can carry up to 50 of these bombs! ... These planes will fly until they stop your atrocities and kick you out of Kosovo and Metohija. If you want to survive and see your families again, drop your weapons ... "

… But it cannot be said that Yugoslavia was doomed in this confrontation. Yes, in Belgrade, headquarters, buildings of military and civil infrastructure, and social facilities were subjected to methodical strikes. Cruise missiles and "smart" bombs hit targets marked with "beacons" placed by American agents. But the Yugoslav army did not suffer the losses that Washington and Brussels had counted on. Serb military units successfully maneuvered, used camouflage and heat traps for NATO missiles. The air defense forces gradually learned how to deal with air targets, shooting down an "invisible" F-117 Stealth and a couple of Mirages. The army retained the backbone and combat capability ... But the methodical information and psychological processing of the Serbs bore fruit - the official Belgrade accepted the terms of the ultimatum of the international community. The territory of Kosovo, along with the formations of the Albanians, was occupied by the Americans, the British and their allies. Moscow's demands to include Russia in the format of the operation in Kosovo in order to end the genocide of the Serb population were ignored. In these conditions, the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces and the headquarters of the Airborne Forces made an adventurous at first glance and risky decision - an advanced detachment as part of a separate paratrooper battalion to make a seven-hundred-kilometer march into the very heart of Kosovo, ahead of the NATO units that had begun moving through Serbian territory, to seize the military Slatina airfield and ensure the landing of the main forces of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. It is significant that even President Yeltsin did not know about this plan, to whom the operation would be reported after its completion. Such secrecy paid off 100% - at least, the pro-Western circle of the Russian president was completely in the dark, not having time to present the situation to him in the light he needed and to disrupt the airborne battalion's rush.

"I dream of march at night"

It looked like a picture from another life - flowers on armor, Serbian girls kissing Russian soldiers, stormy glee. A battalion of Russian paratroopers took up positions at the Slatina airfield in Kosovo. How did the military prepare and conduct this march? With these questions, a conversation began with a direct participant in the events described, the commander of the Russian airborne battalion that had moved to Kosovo, Colonel Sergei Pavlov.

NATO planes over our camp were lining up in battle formations and leaving for Belgrade. We continued to patrol our area of ​​responsibility, carried out peacekeeping tasks within the framework of the mandate given. There was not even a hint that we could move somewhere. But to be honest, I had a presentiment. A premonition often helps me out, and did not disappoint even then. I suddenly felt that events were coming in which we would be active participants, although I personally had two months left before the replacement.

Usually during this period, any commander is not particularly zealous in the service. And I have just the opposite. The people said: "What has it found on the battalion commander, after all, it is time for him to relax and prepare for the rotation?"

In May, we completed the transfer of equipment for the summer period of operation. I approached this question very seriously and asked my subordinates harshly, focusing on the quality of the translation. Ultimately, this is what became the guarantor of success.

We were given only 8 hours to prepare for the 700 km march! No one had a more rigid time frame in my memory, even in the Airborne Forces. Is anyone able to repeat what we succeeded then? Great question. I'm not sure.

We had to take off three posts that night. People were far in the mountains, communication was limp. While we passed it, while we duplicated it, while we were understood correctly and we gathered everyone, it took time. People got the feeling that something serious was being prepared. The tension was general, but I did not see that they were afraid.

... Time came "H" and our column began to move ... When the combat order was given, we realized that in an hour the whole world would know about us. Can you imagine our feelings? How will a country on its knees react to this? God forbid, there will be failure ... We were not afraid for ourselves, for our own skin. There was a feeling of great responsibility, because then there would be no excuse. How to look people in the eye - why didn't you do it, didn't you fulfill it? And you are always afraid for people. God forbid…

The march passed without loss. People then realized that my strictness bore fruit - during the march not a single unit of equipment failed. The task was completed. But I was accused of being too harsh and exacting, they said that it could have been softer. The truth was on my side. Now I sleep well, knowing that not a single mother, not a single wife curses me ... We brought everyone without loss, we completed the task without clashes. Then I crossed myself and said: "Thank God, everyone is alive."

Was there a danger along the route? How did the events unfold?

Our passage was provided at a high level. So we never say that General Rybkin and I did everything. The decision was made at the top, and we only implemented it with high quality. We practically "flew" the Serbian towns. Police patrols and border guards provided a green corridor. We were led, the reconnaissance worked on five points.

I assumed there would be something. An hour or two or three passed, and someone could wake up, NATO members could land a landing by landing method. What does it cost them? After all, we were opposed by the huge colossus of NATO. Of course, we were preparing for surprises, up to and including clashes. We had a full ammunition load. But we were counting on surprise - we set off on Sunday straight along the Autobahn, although I know that the option of driving through the mountains was considered. We "flew" along the road. Then I learned that the American command made a decision to land the rangers, organize an ambush and detain us in any way. Allegedly, on board the BTA aircraft with a capture group, a balloon came off, injured someone, and this venture fell through. Maybe they were smart enough not to bring matters to clashes. But we didn't have much fun.

Soldiers and officers awarded for this march?

You are the first journalist to ask about the awards of soldiers and officers. But this is a big problem. Everyone is only interested in one thing - who gave the order to march? And what is my business, who gave it? My immediate superior gave me the order, and I have no right to ask questions about who in the upper echelons made the decision. This is none of my business, because we received an order and went to carry it out.

I know that not everyone was awarded. The medal "To the participant of the Bosnia-Kosovo march" was established. Someone was noted, but I know for sure that two of my deputies did not receive it. Why dont know. Five years ago, in Ivanovo, I met with my deputy for educational affairs, Yevgeny Morozov, and battalion chief of staff Vadim Poloyan, who were left without medals. Laughter, and nothing more. They say to me: "Commander, how is that?" What can I do? I was ready to give up my medal, but I needed two ...

But I know for sure that those who did not participate in this march also received these awards. Our entire award structure, those who sit in the headquarters, had to go out of their way to find and reward all the participants in the march. Two years after the march, a soldier came to me from a village in the Ryazan region and said that everyone in the village teased him, they say, you hang noodles, that you are a participant in the march in Kosovo, but there is no medal. I had to call the personnel bodies again and demand ...

For me personally, awards are not important, I say this without pretense. The best reward is that I kept the fighters for whom I was responsible ... It was very difficult to get people out of such a rework ... Experience shows that losses - returnable and irrecoverable - are far from all combat losses. A huge percentage of losses due to slovenliness, due to carelessness, careless handling of weapons, and lack of foresight. We, in those conditions, avoided this, we did not have a single injury.

For ten years in a row, journalists visited me in Ryazan, and then another well-known surname sounded in the media. It turned out that I was unwittingly, as it were, deleted from history. The Russian mentality immediately worked - they stopped coming to me and asking questions. A lot of assessments, new versions, guesses have appeared, but I am calm about it ...

When did you enter Kosovo, what and who did you encounter?

At 1.00-1.30 a.m. Pristina passed - the entire population on the streets. They delayed us a little. When we were out of town, a menacing call sounded from Moscow. The column was stopped. General Rybkin talked with someone for a long time on the phone, then we convinced him that we still need to walk six kilometers and complete the task.

We were supposed to occupy the airfield by 5.00 in the morning. By this time, units of the Serbian Armed Forces should have left him and an English brigade had to approach. We were ahead of her by an hour and a half. The scouts reported that a Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) unit was approaching. We managed to take positions and were ready for battle. They captured the runway, blocked it with armored personnel carriers, cleared the main approach routes, blocked the highway to Macedonia, and set up positions along the perimeter. Trenches and caponiers for armored vehicles dug in the rocky ground for three days.

... An hour and a half later, as we settled down, one of the posts reported that British intelligence had approached. The British stopped within sight and were simply "stunned" when they saw our paratroopers. An English general drove up and spoke in "Esperanto" - broken English. "Who you are? What are you doing here? We should be here, ”I heard about the following words. I had to answer that they were late, that here were the positions of the Russian landing. The general was escorted to our general's headquarters. There were no collisions ...

Serbian girls kiss battalion commander Sergei Pavlov 14 years after the legendary throw on Pristina. In Russia, many do not know their heroes by sight

Sergey Evgenievich, the question is essentially - what was the Airborne Forces battalion doing in Kosovo?

Yugoslavia was bombed, NATO was solving the problem of Kosovo and Metohija by force - a disputed territory with interethnic and interreligious conflict. It is not for me to give a political assessment of whether Milosevic was right when he sent troops there, or not, and who began to slaughter whom. Politicians and historians will figure it out. But the West acted here, defiantly ignoring Russia. Chernomyrdin sat for days with Albright, but as a result, Kosovo began to be divided into zones of responsibility without Russia.

Then the decision was made to enter Kosovo independently. Our battalion was an advanced detachment - a military formation that captures a line, a section of terrain, an area and provides the approach of the main forces. We had to ensure the landing of our main forces at the airfield. True, for a number of reasons, the landing did not land, and the Russian peacekeeping contingent arrived in a different way. The main thing that we succeeded is that Russia took part in the fate of the Kosovo Serbs. Initially, this was enough to prevent the genocide that the Albanians committed there. This was our mission. What happened next is well known, but it is not for us to judge. In any case, I do not want to give political assessments. And as a person I am very bitter ... Now, 14 years later, we communicate with Serbs, and they teach us a lesson of patriotism, love for their land, people, love for Russia.

What was happening in Kosovo in those days?

We saw what the Kosovo Liberation Army was doing. They burned and blew up Orthodox churches, massacred Serbs. They did not go to the airfield - they knew that they would be rebuffed. And the dairy plant in Pristina was repeatedly tried to penetrate, staged provocations. We took this territory under protection, thereby saving many Serbs from reprisals. The Albanians showed offensive gestures, captured the Serbs, put a knife to their throats and tried to cut in front of our eyes. And we had no right to open fire. The soldiers ran out, became human shields, dragged and took people away. All this was done under video cameras. Pure provocation ...

Is it true that then a few shots were enough for the situation to explode?

First, the fact that the British approached us became a deterrent. Our commanders acted wisely - they launched them to the airfield, gave them a place to sleep. But threats were constantly addressed to us.

We received intelligence, from which directions to wait for an attack, as best we could, disguised ourselves, limited any movement, we were warned that Albanian snipers were operating, that the task was to take our paratroopers prisoner, kill, kill, which we were personally warned by the Chief of the General Staff, General Kvashnin ... But someone had enough reason not to climb. We have organized round-the-clock combat duty.

The soldiers are great, no sloppiness or relaxation. People were really ready. We had experienced contract soldiers, good officers.

... I will not forget the picture in the first days after the march. One 37-year-old contract soldier - an experienced warrior - is lying on the breastwork of the trench and listening. "What are you listening to?" - "Will they arrive or not." I answer him like in a movie: "Don't worry, they will arrive, of course."

They constantly provoked us - they let livestock directly to our positions, and we knew that the animals were not led by shepherds, but by scouts. They drove them away, for this there are different tricks. The main thing in that situation was not to break loose, not to provoke the shooting. Next to our positions there was a fuel and lubricants depot. The Kosovars robbed him, took out the fuel on tractors, constantly provoking the fighters.

When our main forces began to arrive by sea and by air, it became much easier, the tension subsided. We've been strengthened a lot. We met the troops, sent them to the sectors, and ourselves served at the airfield.

14 years have passed, and I cannot forget anything. The march before my eyes - from the first second to the last. I was responsible for almost everything, and I still cannot forget this sense of responsibility. I no longer had such stress in my life. I remember everything - preparation, "racing" on the Autobahn, a stabbed woman, tears of women and old people ... This is the most vivid impression in my life.

I dream of the march in Kosovo, and I will dream until the end of my days. I continue to command at night ... In principle, we did everything right - we completed the task, saved people and equipment ...

Kidnapping: political string bag holes

The battalion commander Sergei Pavlov is a man of the old school, well-mannered, correct and laconic. Now he teaches at the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School named after General of the Army V.F. Margelov. Cadets often ask him to tell about that march.

... Undoubtedly, the swift march of the Airborne Forces on Pristina in June 1999 can rightfully be called a small victory for Russia. And it was not the cabinet successes of diplomacy or even strong-willed blows with a fist on the table that ensured it, but a simple battalion commander and his subordinates.
True, as often happens in such cases, victory always has many fathers, and defeat is an orphan. With surprise, the Airborne Forces later learned about many "heroes" of this legendary march, who either did not participate in it at all, or had, to put it mildly, a very, very indirect relationship. Some of them still sit in the State Duma and hold posts in the executive bodies of power. Although in fairness it should be noted that the manner of sculpting fake "heroes" went from meticulous to "sensational" media, often not bothering to establish and convey the truth to people.

They say that on the occasion of the successful operation of the paratroopers' occupation of the airfield in Slatina, three gold medals were issued. Allegedly, they awarded politicians and important bosses with them. "The paratroopers do not need gold," they assured me of the Union of Russian paratroopers. "But all the soldiers and officers who took part in the events of 14 years ago must be marked by the state." But not everyone got even the usual commemorative medals.

For the veterans of those events, this is just a pleasant trifle, which, perhaps, is even remembered only once a year, putting on awards at special events. It is not customary for paratroopers to flaunt awards. But if the command orders to arrive at the orders - you should have seen this iconostasis! But still…

But this is only one side of the coin. The other side is that the courageous, Russian-style daring assault force was completely unsupported in the political plane. Yes, the Russian peacekeeping contingent has regularly served for several years, in Bosnia and Kosovo, personifying an example of the fulfillment of a peacekeeping mission.

But the facts are a stubborn thing - the Kosovo Serbs have lost their homeland. The tens of thousands who remained in the region are still writing letters to the Kremlin asking them to be admitted to Russian citizenship, because they were turned away from them in Belgrade. Dozens of Orthodox monasteries have been looted in Kosovo, hundreds of churches have been destroyed and burned. The majority of the population left those places. And Russia, with all its breadth and abundance of resources, could not resist this wave, could not become an obstacle on the path of injustice and outright evil. However, at the end of 1999, the command of the Russian brigade stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina informed Moscow of a favorable moment for the creation of Russian military bases in the Balkans. This appeal was never heard, and history, as you know, does not tolerate the subjunctive mood ...

Today, the reality is that the mental gap between Serbia and Russia is widening. The older generation, especially those people who remember the times of the USSR and the SFRY, communicated and worked together with peacekeepers from Russia, still feel an invisible connection with the Russian world, value it and are afraid to break it. But the younger generation in the same Belgrade no longer knows the Russian language, far from the glorious and tragic pages of our common history. Young people, as in the megalopolises of Russia, are infected with the same “disease of consumerism,” in which the issues of spirit and identity do not matter at all.

Many Serbs, in fact Serbia and the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have already been deployed to the West. In relations with Russia, the local elite sees primarily economic interest, that is, only business. Other spheres - cultural and spiritual, issues of common faith, at best, are only declared and faded into the background. Serbs are learning to survive without Russia, although the decision to lay the South Stream gas pipeline through Serbian territories has been greeted with great enthusiasm and expectation of big changes for the better. As they joke here, let "the Russians would rather turn off the gas than the Germans let them in."

For all the warmth and sincerity of the Serbian public figures and officials who met and communicated with the Russian Airborne Forces delegation, the President of the Republika Srpska Miodrag Dodik, who regularly holds operational meetings with Gazprom representatives, did not find time to communicate with the participants in the legendary attack on Kosovo. Probably, the priorities and preferences have changed ...

“... Russia was systematically squeezed out of the Balkans. For different reasons. The long-term efforts of the Russian peacekeepers are in vain. The Balkans have reoriented themselves to a well-fed Europe and are flirting with the United States. On the eve of the NATO aggression, the Serbs liked to repeat: "We are 200 million with Russia, we are brothers" ... - this is the opinion of one of the paratroopers of the peacekeeping contingent. - We will never forget how the Serbs met us. This is how Europe, freed from the Nazis, met the Russians during the Second World War. This is not forgotten, never ... Recently I read a comment on the Internet: “We then wiped our nose at NATO. They were really scared, but as always, they betrayed us ... They betrayed their own. The military has been betrayed, the Serbs ... And therefore we are not respected ... ”. To realize that there is some truth in this is insulting and bitter. But this is not our fault. We did our best. But for the state it is all the same insulting, very much. Still..."

Uglevik - Banja Luka - Moscow

Leaflet on the Serbian and Albanian population of KOSOVO, prepared and distributed by unknown persons in April-May 1999: WANTED live or embalmed BILLY CLINTON is a very dangerous criminal, recidivist thief, sexually preoccupied, although, in fact, quite helpless in sexual the man who fucked up the oath given to the Albanians to liberate Kosovo. Reward for the capture: $ 45 million in your pocket (or the F-117 Black Falcon aircraft in good condition and without a pilot). We ask you to provide the available information to the following address: Kosovo Liberation Army, NATO, Brussels, Greater Albania. Note: the flyer is written in Serbo-Croatian, but using transcriptions that reproduce the Albanian pronunciation

Residents of the capital of the Republic of Srpska, Banja Luka, meet a delegation of Russian paratroopers with a banner

Reserve Colonel Sergei Pavlov is the commander of the battalion that marched in Kosovo and occupied the Slatina airfield. Now - Associate Professor of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School named after General of the Army V.F. Margelov

Reserve Colonel Hero of Russia Alexander Margelov talks to a Russian volunteer who fought in the Balkans, Sergei Sukharev

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Russian paratroopers lay a wreath at the memorial at the site of the Jasenovac concentration camp, where the Croatian Ustash tortured about 700 thousand people during World War II

Delegation of the Union of Russian Paratroopers at a conference dedicated to the 14th anniversary of the march to Pristina, in the town of Uglevik, Republika Srpska

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15 years have passed since the legendary military operation of the Russian army, an example of which has not been found in the modern history of Europe. In June 1999, our paratroopers marched into Kosovo and captured the Slatina airfield. This was a complete surprise to the NATO command, which at that time was conducting a punitive operation in the former Yugoslavia. The participants in the operation were awarded state awards. Its success had a positive impact on the image of the Russian armed forces.

NATO air forces began bombing Yugoslavia on March 27, 1999. For two and a half months, the country's infrastructure was actually destroyed, many civilians were killed. The Yugoslav army, however, retained its combat capability. However, the West has already relied on the dismemberment of the country.

The entry of the NATO ground contingent into the territory of the Kosovo Territory was scheduled for June 12. And the agreements reached by Moscow and Washington were replayed at the last moment.

“There was no agreement that we were entering. The agreements were kind of programmed, but then they were destroyed, and NATO arrogated to itself the right to act without coordinated actions with everyone. They themselves began to impose, offer us a battalion there, put us in a humiliating subordinate position. And the first was to save the prestige of Russia. And you cannot not enter, and you cannot enter on their terms. Therefore, it was necessary to play an independent game in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, "recalls the head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (in 1999) Leonid Ivashov.

In these conditions, the Kremlin sets the task of carrying out a parallel deployment of troops with NATO in order to control its sector of Kosovo, and most importantly, the key airport in Slatina, not far from the capital of the province of Pristina.

But the Hungarians and Bulgarians, under pressure from the West, are closing their airspace for our aircraft. Then, on the night of June 11-12, a battalion of the Russian Airborne Forces located in Bosnia, as part of a peacekeeping mission, secretly moves towards Yugoslavia.

It was to these fighters that the task was set: avoiding the opposition of NATO forces, in the shortest possible time, make a throw of 600 kilometers, occupy the airfield, and hold it. This is the only airfield in the region capable of receiving heavy transport aircraft. And it was necessary to take it first.

Thanks to skilful intelligence actions, it was possible to outwit the tactical command of NATO. And when they realized it, the armored personnel carriers of our airborne battalion, deploying the Russian tricolors, were already moving through the territory of Serbia towards their goal. Won 6 hours.

The same task - control over a key airfield - was assigned to the forward units of NATO forces, which are located very close to Kosovo - at the Macedonian border. They also move towards the object.

The third hour of the night on June 12. The Russian battalion is already entering Pristina. But here the column slows down. Forced. The news that the Russians were coming spread across the country very quickly. And the Kosovo Serbs, despite the late hour, pour out into the streets and greet our column.

"In my head - Russia, Russia, Russia. The great Russian land. The land to my heart", - recalls a local resident Radovan Pecic.

From here, Slatina airport is only 15 kilometers away. Early in the morning, two leading British armored columns are already moving there. At the disposal of our command, there are only 200 airborne troops and eight armored personnel carriers. But by seven o'clock in the morning, the battalion is in position.

For the Englishmen who arrived at 11, the appearance of the Russians did not come as a surprise - only on the way the situation was reported to them by intelligence, which itself missed the throw of our battalion. At the airfield, the British really found the Russian paratroopers who had already well dug in and occupied a perimeter defense. The landing of the main NATO contingent in the only suitable place has become simply impossible.

Sergey Psurtsev, TV Center.